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Intimate Partner Criminal Harassment
Through a Lens of Responsibilization
ISABEL GRANT *
Feminist scholars have demonstrated the gendered nature of intimate violence and the
tendency to put the responsibility on women to avoid both sexual and physical violence
(“responsibilization”). This article applies these insights to the context of intimate partner
criminal harassment, which is committed overwhelmingly by men against former female
intimate partners. Using criminal harassment decisions over the past decade, this article
argues that the elements of the offence—specifically the requirements that the accused
cause the complainant to fear for her safety, that this fear be reasonable, and that he intend
to harass her—feed into the tendency towards responsibilization. Women are disbelieved if
they fail to report the harassment promptly to police, fail to obtain a no contact order, or fail to
communicate to their harassers that the harassment is unwanted. The accused’s behaviour
is never subjected to a standard of reasonableness. The article concludes that legislative
reform is a necessary step towards providing an adequate criminal justice response to this
serious problem.
Les universitaires féministes ont démontré que la violence conjugale est fondée sur le sexe
et qu’il existe une tendance à responsabiliser les femmes afin qu’elles évitent de subir
des violences tant physiques que sexuelles. Cet article applique ces notions intuitives au
contexte du harcèlement criminel par un partenaire intime, qui est commis dans la très
grande majorité des cas par les hommes à l’égard de leur ancienne conjointe. Se fondant
sur les jugements en matière de harcèlement criminel rendus depuis dix ans, l’article est
d’avis que les éléments de la preuve–particulièrement la nécessité que l’accusé ait porté la
plaignante à craindre pour sa sécurité, que cette crainte soit fondée et qu’il ait eu l’intention
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de la harceler–étayent cette tendance à la responsabilisation. On croit moins les femmes si
elles tardent à déclarer promptement à la police le fait qu’elles sont harcelées, négligent
de réclamer une ordonnance d’interdiction de communiquer ou négligent de faire savoir à
leur harceleur que le harcèlement est non désiré. Le comportement de l’accusé n’est jamais
soumis à la norme du raisonnable. L’article conclut qu’une réforme législative s’impose afin
que la justice criminelle soit en mesure de répondre adéquatement à ce grave problème.
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ONE OF THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTIONS of feminist scholarship to criminal law

has been to establish the gendered nature of intimate partner violence.1 Intimate
partner violence and sexual assault, for example, are committed overwhelmingly
by men against women. In this article, I explore how intimate partner criminal
harassment is also a gendered crime and how judicial decisions reflect the same
biases and assumptions that other gendered crimes reveal. Specifically, I will argue
that, as with sexual assault, the law of criminal harassment has been influenced by
assumptions about how women should respond to male violence and how they
are responsible for changing their lives in order to avoid it.2 This tendency to put
1.
2.

Lisa S Price, Feminist Frameworks: Building Theory on Violence against Women (Halifax:
Fernwood, 2005) at 11.
I am indebted to Lise Gotell whose groundbreaking work demonstrates how discourses of
responsibilization and risk management are prevalent in Canadian sexual assault decisions.
See e.g. Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law:
Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41:4 Akron L Rev 865 [Gotell,
“Rethinking Affirmative Consent”]; Lise Gotell, “The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized
Violence: Feminist Law Reform, Judicial Resistance, and Neo-Liberal Sexual Citizenship” in
Dorothy E Chunn, Susan B Boyd & Hester Lessard, eds, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism,
Law and Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 127 [Gotell, “The Discursive
Disappearance”].
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responsibility on women to avoid gendered violence, referred to in this article as
“responsibilization,” has hindered effective law enforcement of these crimes. In the
context of criminal harassment, this tendency is facilitated both by the legislative
requirements of criminal harassment and by the judicial interpretation thereof.
The Supreme Court of Canada has had many opportunities to deal with
gendered crimes in recent years and has fallen short.3 Emma Cunliffe has
demonstrated, for example, that equality is rarely given serious consideration
in recent sexual assault decisions of the Court.4 With respect to sexual assault
prosecutions more generally, women are often criticized for their inadequate
expressions of non-consent or for other behaviours that may have “encouraged”
the violence against them.5 This article demonstrates that the same phenomenon
is seen in criminal harassment cases. By definition, this crime requires the Crown
to prove that the complainant, who is almost always a woman in intimate partner
harassment, was afraid for her safety or that of others and that her fear was
3.

4.

5.

See R v JA, 2011 SCC 28, [2011] 2 SCR 440 [JA]. In JA, while the outcome is consistent
with gender equality, the analysis takes a gender-neutral approach to sexual assault and
fails to examine the context of intimate partner violence that was so central to the case.
For further analysis on JA, see Janine Benedet, “Marital Rape, Polygamy, and Prostitution:
Trading Sex Equality for Agency and Choice?” (2013) 18:2 Rev Const Stud 161 [Benedet,
“Marital Rape”]. See also R v Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, [2015] 1 SCR 346. In Hutchinson,
the majority failed to consider the implications of its approach to statutory interpretation
for complainants with mental disabilities or other forms of incapacity to consent such as
intoxication (see Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 273.1(2)(b)-(c)). The majority’s
approach also fails to see sexual assault as a gendered phenomenon. For a discussion of
how sexual assault has become degendered and detached from equality, see Gotell, “The
Discursive Disappearance,” supra note 2. See also R v DAI, 2012 SCC 5, [2012] 1 SCR
149 (involving the sexual assault of a woman with a mental disability); R v O’Brien, 2013
SCC 2, [2013] 1 SCR 7 (involving uttering threats in the context of an intimate partner
relationship); R v Ryan, 2013 SCC 3, [2013] 1 SCR 14 (involving the defence of duress
for a woman who had been repeatedly harassed by her ex-partner). In all of these decisions,
the gendered nature of intimate partner violence and sexual assault is missing from the
Court’s analysis.
Emma Cunliffe, “Sexual Assault Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Losing Sight
of Substantive Equality” (2012) 57 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 295. Cunliffe argues that while
equality has underpinned the development of the substantive definition of consent as well
as legislative reforms to improve trial procedure, individual complainants are still not fully
protected from myths and stereotypes in situations where consent and credibility are in issue.
This is not due to the absence of legal tools to address these problems but instead a result of
the failure of judicial approaches to infuse equality reasoning in trial and appellate decisions.
In her article on the ethical responsibilities of defence counsel in sexual assault prosecutions,
Elaine Craig demonstrates that defence counsel still make use of stereotypes about women’s
sexuality in defending sexual assault prosecutions. See Elaine Craig, “The Ethical Obligations
of Defence Counsel in Sexual Assault Cases” (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 427.
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reasonable in the circumstances. The response of the complainant is scrutinized
and may be found wanting, thus preventing a successful prosecution. The
woman’s life may be significantly disrupted by the harassment, she may have to
change much of her day-to-day routine, and she may be unable to work because
of the harassment. But if she was not afraid for her safety in a way that is judged
by others to be reasonable, the law does not recognize the harassment. At no time,
however, is her harasser held to a standard of objectively reasonable behaviour.
Section 264 of the Criminal Code sets out the definition of criminal
harassment in Canada:
1. No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another
person is harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is
harassed, engage in conduct referred to in subsection (2) that causes
that other person reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for
their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.
2. The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of
a. repeatedly following from place to place the other person or
anyone known to them;
b. repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly,
the other person or anyone known to them;
c. besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the
other person, or anyone known to them, resides, works, carries
on business or happens to be; or
d. engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person
or any member of their family.6
The offence is a hybrid offence punishable by a maximum 10 years on
indictment and 6 months on summary conviction.7 Parliament enacted this
section in 1993 in response to a number of murders of women by former intimate
partners after a period of criminal harassment.8 Section 231(6) was also added to
the Criminal Code in 1997. It classifies murders that take place in the course of
criminal harassment as first-degree murder.9
This article begins with a brief description of what we know about intimate
partner criminal harassment in terms of its incidence, its impact on the women
harassed, and the criminal justice response to this crime. Part II summarizes the
6.
7.
8.
9.

Supra note 3, ss 264(1)-(2).
Ibid, ss 264(3), 787(1).
See Isabel Grant, Natasha Bone & Kathy Grant, “Canada’s Criminal Harassment Provisions:
A Review of the First Ten Years” (2003) 29:1 Queen’s LJ 175.
Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 231(6).
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theoretical literature on the concept of “responsibilization” as informed by the
work of feminists in the areas of sexual assault and intimate partner violence.
After setting out this context, the article turns to an analysis of the case law
on intimate partner harassment, focusing on three elements of the offence:
the requirement that the complainant be afraid for her safety or the safety of
others, the requirement that the fear be reasonable, and the requirement that the
accused know that his conduct is harassing. The focus of this article is the judicial
discourse around the elements of criminal harassment and how this discourse
perpetuates problematic assumptions about gendered violence and women’s
responsibility to avoid it.

I. THE EMPIRICAL REALITY OF CRIMINAL HARASSMENT
While a number of academic articles were written after section 264 was enacted,10
criminal harassment is under-studied and under-theorized in more recent legal
and feminist literature in Canada. However, a significant social science and
medical literature exploring criminal harassment reveals how dangerous and
destructive former intimate partner harassment can be for women.11
10. Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Criminalization of Stalking: An Exercise in Media Manipulation
and Political Opportunism” (1994) 39 McGill LJ 379; Grant, Bone & Grant, supra note 8;
Bruce MacFarlane, “People Who Stalk People” (1997) 31:1 UBC L Rev 37; Diane Crocker,
“Criminalizing Harassment and the Transformative Potential of Law” (2008) 20:1 CJWL 87.
11. See e.g. Kimberly N Fleming et al, “Intimate Partner Stalking Victimization and
Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms in Post-Abuse Women” (2012) 18:12 Violence Against
Women 1368; Maria A Pico-Alfonso et al, “The Impact of Physical, Psychological, and
Sexual Intimate Male Partner Violence on Women’s Mental Health: Depressive Symptoms,
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, State Anxiety, and Suicide” (2006) 15:5 J of Women’s Health
599; Nadine Wathen, “Health Impacts of Violent Victimization on Women and their
Children” (2012) at 10-11, online: Department of Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/rr12_12/index.html>; World Health Organization, Global and regional
estimates of violence against women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence
and non-partner sexual violence (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2013) at
21-26, online: <www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/9789241564625/
en>; Laura E Watkins et al, “The Longitudinal Impact of Intimate Partner Aggression and
Relationship Status on Women’s Physical Health and Depression Symptoms” (2014) 28:5
J Family Psych 655; Emily Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime or a Crime of Violence?”
(2002) 41:5 Howard J Crim Just 422 [Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime”]; Frank R
Farnham, David V James & Paul Cantrell, “Association between violence, psychosis, and
relationship to victim and stalkers” (2000) 355 The Lancet 199; David V James & Frank
R Farnham, “Stalking and Serious Violence” (2003) 31 J Am Psych Law 432; Michele
Pathé, Rachel Mackenzie & Paul Mullen, “Stalking by law: damaging victims and rewarding
offenders” (2004) 12 JL Med 103 at 106; Leila B Dutton & Barbara A Winstead, “Types,
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The extent of criminal harassment and its threat to women’s equality should
not be underestimated. Women experience criminal harassment in Canada at
an alarming rate. In the most recent Statistics Canada survey, for example, 3%
of all women reported being stalked in 2009.12 In 2011, uttering threats and
criminal harassment accounted for 20% of violent crime against women in
Canada.13 There were approximately 11,700 female victims of police-reported
criminal harassment in 2011, which constituted more than 75% of all criminal
harassment complaints to police.14 In that same year, 85% of perpetrators in
incidents against women were men. Intimate partners accounted for 58% of all
criminal harassment of women. Strangers accounted for only 8% of criminal
harassment.15 In the past decade, 39 women have been murdered after being
criminally harassed, including 3 women who were killed in 2011.16
Studies also suggest that a large number of women who have been criminally
harassed by a former partner have also been assaulted or sexually assaulted by
him.17 While criminal harassment does not necessarily involve further physical
violence, intimate partner criminal harassment is more likely to escalate to assault
or even femicide than other forms of criminal harassment.18 Intimate partner
criminal harassment is also likely to last up to twice as long on average as other

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

Frequency, and Effectiveness of Responses to Unwanted Pursuit and Stalking” (2011) 26:6 J
Interpersonal Violence 1129.
Statistics Canada, Measuring violence against women: statistical trends, Sinha Maire,
ed (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 25 February 2013) at 33 [Statistics Canada,
Measuring violence].
Ibid at 8. According to this recent Statistics Canada report, “the five most common violent
offences committed against women were common assault (49%), uttering threats (13%),
serious assault (10%), sexual assault level I (7%), and criminal harassment (7%).”
Ibid at 32.
Ibid.
Ibid at 33. In the United States, a study of intimate partner femicides in 10 cities found
that 76% of victims had been “stalked” in the 12 months prior to the killing. See Judith
M McFarlane et al, “Stalking in Intimate Partner Femicide” (1999) 3:4 Homicide
Studies 300 at 308.
Carol E Jordan et al, “Stalking: an Examination of the Criminal Justice Response” (2003)
18:2 J Interpersonal Violence 148 at 149.
Farnham, James & Cantrell, supra note 11 at 199. This study found that 70% of the sample
of intimate partner harassments involved serious physical violence, whereas only 27% of
the stranger/acquaintance sample did. See also James & Farnham, “Stalking and Serious
Violence,” supra note 11 at 433, 438.
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forms of criminal harassment.19 Intimate partner criminal harassers are less likely
to have a serious mental illness than those who harass strangers.20 When it comes
to criminal harassment, women are at greatest risk of escalating violence from
non-mentally ill, former intimate partners.21
Intimate partner criminal harassment is often only one component of a
constellation of behaviours, such as assault and threatening, all of which together
form part of the male partner’s assertion of control over his (former) partner.22
Evan Stark describes “stalking” as the most common behavioural component of
coercive control next to assault.23 As such, intimate partner criminal harassment
can be seen as a variant of intimate partner violence, which reflects the ongoing
inequality of women in intimate relationships.24 As Rosemary Cairns Way
has pointed out:
Stalking is one vicious manifestation of a broader spectrum of violence against
women–one part of a multi-faceted whole, integrally linked to the systemic
social, economic and political inequalities experienced daily by Canadian women.
The statistics detailing the extent of violence against women in Canada provide
horrifying evidence of the “brutal face of inequality.”25

Criminal harassment is an extremely traumatic experience that often
continues for a significant period of time. Women respond in different ways to
this kind of ongoing stress in their lives. For some women, the harm resulting
from harassment “is severe and long-lasting; indeed the adverse consequences
caused by victimization frequently outlive the duration of the harassment.”26
Finch cites English studies that suggest that from 71–94% of those subjected to
19. Evan Stark, Coercive Control: The Entrapment of Women in Personal Life (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007) at 256 [Stark, Coercive Control]. See also Terry Goldsworthy &
Matthew Raj, “Stopping the stalker: Victim responses to stalking” (2014) 2:1 Griffith J Law
& Human Dignity 171 at 190.
20. Farnham, James & Cantrell, supra note 11 at 199.
21. Ibid.
22. Joanna Birenbaum & Isabel Grant, “Taking Threats Seriously: Section 264.1 and Threats as a
form of Domestic Violence” (2012) 59 Crim LQ 206 at 214.
23. Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 19 at 256.
24. See e.g. Jordan et al, supra note 17 at 149. The authors state that “stalking is but one variant
of intimate violence.” Feminist scholars have debated the meaning and definition of violence
and whether it requires actual force before behaviour can be labelled violent. See Price, supra
note 1 at 11-23. For an argument that uttering threats is a form of intimate partner violence,
see also Birenbaum & Grant, supra note 22. Statistics Canada describes criminal harassment
as a violent crime. See Statistics Canada, Measuring violence, supra note 12 at 4.
25. Supra note 10 at 381.
26. Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime,” supra note 11 at 424.
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harassment undergo major lifestyle and personality changes.27 Sleep and appetite
disturbances are common.28 Complainants are likely to become paranoid,
anxious, introverted, and less trustful generally, not just with respect to the
harasser. Complainants also commonly experience social isolation and a sense of
powerlessness. There is a high risk of depressive symptoms, including self-harm.29
The General Social Survey found that female complainants were more likely than
their male counterparts to stop going out alone and to socialize less after experiencing criminal harassment.30
Criminal justice responses to intimate partner harassment have been
found wanting in a number of jurisdictions. In Canada, the majority of police
complaints do not result in formal charges. Many charges are dropped without
proceeding, or dropped in exchange for the accused entering into a no contact
order. An early review of charges under section 264, for example, found that
58% of charges were stayed or withdrawn before trial and, of those charges that
proceeded, only about 35% were convicted.31 The large American National
Violence against Women Survey in 2000 found that for every 100 female stalking
victims identified, “52 reported the crimes to the police, 13 men were prosecuted,
7 were convicted, and 4 went to jail.”32 It is no surprise that victims of criminal
harassment lack confidence in the criminal justice system, which leads to even
lower rates of reporting.33 As with sexual assault, the complainant’s credibility
27.
28.
29.
30.

Ibid.
Dutton & Winstead, supra note 11 at 1131.
Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime,” supra note 11 at 425.
Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile 2005, Kathy Aucoin, ed
(Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2005) at 40 [Statistics Canada, Family Violence].
31. Richard Gill & Joan Brockman, Department of Justice Canada, A Review of Section 264
(Criminal Harassment) of the Criminal Code of Canada (Ottawa: Department of Justice,
October 1996) at vii, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/wd96_7-dt96_7/
wd96_7.pdf>. A more recent study conducted in the United States found that 54% of
amended felony charges of criminal harassment and 62% of amended misdemeanour charges
were dismissed. See Jordan et al, supra note 17 at 159.
32. Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 19 at 256.
33. See Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group, Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into Stalking
Law Reform: Main Findings and Recommendations (February 2012) at 8-9, 11 (Chair: Rt
Hon Elfyn Llwyd MP), online: DASH (2009) <www.dashriskchecklist.co.uk/uploads/
Stalking%20Law%20Reform%20Findings%20Report%202012.pdf>. The inquiry cites
a study presented to it in which 72% of complainants reported being unhappy with the
criminal justice response to the harassment, while 65% reported being unhappy with the
police response. Complainants reported that their complaints to police were not investigated
thoroughly even though reports were usually not made to police until after a significant
number of incidents.
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may be doubted because she has had ongoing contact with the accused or because
she is distraught when she reports the harassment to police.34 In some cases, the
complainant actually returns to her former partner as a means of ending the
harassment, further undermining her credibility with the police.35 Police may see
the matter as ‘merely’ a domestic dispute that should be resolved privately, particularly where the isolated acts of the harasser are not in themselves threatening or
physically violent.
No contact orders36 are often resorted to in criminal harassment cases, but
they often fail to stop the harassment and can be counterproductive in some
cases.37 As Michele Pathé, Rachel Mackenzie, and Paul Mullen write:
Protection orders provide dubious benefits for the victim but for stalkers unassailable
opportunities to further their harassment. As noted earlier, stalkers may petition
the court for a protection order against the victim, alleging that person is, in fact,
stalking them. [Intimate partner] stalkers are more disposed than other groups
to duplicitous behaviour of this type. Protection order hearings enforce contact
between stalker and victim, imposing a relationship that is both gratifying to the
stalker and distressing to the victim. They indulge the stalker’s quest for personal
information about the victim and endow the stalker with an audience to the litany
of abuses he or she claims to have suffered.38

Perpetrators become quite skilled at learning how to manipulate the limits
of the criminal justice system by finding ways to harass which do not violate the

34. Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11 at 107.
35. Ibid. See e.g. R v VanEindhoven, 2013 NUCJ 30, (2013) 9 CR (7th) 94. In this tragic
case, the victim left a violent relationship and only returned after repeated phone calls
from the accused threatening to kill himself. On her return she was savagely beaten and
stabbed to death.
36. The term “no contact order” is used in this article to refer to peace bonds imposed
under the Criminal Code and protection orders or restraining orders imposed under
provincial legislation.
37. Concern has been raised in British Columbia recently regarding a number of killings of
women by intimate partners who were under no contact orders. See e.g. Andrea Woo
& Justine Hunter, “Deaths show BC is failing victims of domestic violence, watchdog
charges,” The Globe and Mail (13 May 2014) online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
british-columbia/spate-of-deaths-revives-criticism-of-bcs-domestic-violence-program/
article18631650>.
38. Supra note 11 at 108 [emphasis in original].
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terms of the legislation.39 Potentially vexatious family law proceedings are another
mechanism by which perpetrators can disrupt the lives of complainants.40
Having demonstrated the seriousness of intimate partner criminal
harassment, the article now turns to a brief review of the theoretical literature
on “responsibilization” and the ways in which feminist insights in the context of
sexual assault and intimate partner violence have informed our understanding
of gendered violence. The article will then examine the judicial discourse on
intimate partner criminal harassment against this framework.

II. THE RESPONSIBILIZATION OF GENDERED VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN
Criminologists have observed that the shift towards neoliberal economies has
had an impact on governmental approaches to crime.41 In the context of crime
prevention, “[n]eoliberalism valorizes the individual as the rational manager of his
or her own risk portfolio.”42 According to David Garland, neoliberal societies have
accepted “the premise that crime is a normal, commonplace, aspect of modern
society” and that governments have limited ability to prevent or control it.43
Crime becomes understood as a risk to be calculated, and crime prevention
39. Ibid at 104.
40. See Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in Maintaining the
Traditional Family” (2009) 21 CJWL 315 at 333 (describing how courts continue to
award access to fathers who are abusive to the mother). See also Marisa L Beeble, Deborah
Bybee & Cris M Sullivan, “Abusive Men’s Use of Children to Control Their Partners and
Ex-Partners” (2007) 12:1 Eur Psych 54 (describing how abusive men use their children as a
means of controlling their intimate partners). See also Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group,
supra note 33 at 20. The Group recommended that the courts be given the authority to
suspend the parental responsibilities of those who have been convicted of “serious” stalking
offences who use vexatious applications for contact with children to get at the complainant
(Recommendation 21) and the ability to impose civil orders preventing further applications
in Family Court (Recommendation 23).
41. See e.g. David Garland, “‘Governmentality’ and the problem of crime: Foucault, criminology,
sociology” (1997) 1:2 Theor Criminol 173; Kevin D Haggerty, “From Risk to Precaution:
The Rationalities of Personal Crime Prevention” in Richard V Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds,
Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 193; Susan Ilcan, “Privatizing
Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Government” (2009) 46:3 Can Rev
Soc 207; Pat O’Malley, “Risk and responsibility” in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne &
Nikolas Rose, eds, Foucault and political reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of
government (London, UK: UCL Press, 1996) 189.
42. Haggerty, supra note 41 at 193.
43. David Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in
Contemporary Society” (1996) 36:4 Brit J Crim 445 at 450.
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strategies turn to “the conduct of potential victims, to vulnerable situations, and
to those routines of everyday life which create criminal opportunities.”44 These
neoliberal strategies have served to transform our understanding of the model
citizen, who is now deemed the responsible and self-reliant individual whose
reduced expectations of the state mean he or she does not make claims on that
state.45 This idea that people are responsible for managing the risk they face on a
day-to-day basis is referred to in this article as “responsibilization.”
While responsibilization is a relatively new concept in criminology,
blaming women for the violence that is perpetrated against them is hardly a
recent phenomenon. Rather, responsibilization can be seen as a return to placing
responsibility on women for their own safety. As Leslie J Moran has aptly put it:
For women and non-heterosexuals who have long been denied State provision of
safety and security, the rise of individual and private safety strategies is not so much
a new development within the politics of crime control and thereby their social
inclusion, but a long established feature of their social exclusion.46

Elizabeth Stanko notes that, “[i]n terms of personal violence, this positioning
vis-a-vis danger is socially embedded within wider structures of age, class, race/
ethnicity, sexuality, masculinities and patriarchy … especially when negotiating
physical and sexual safety with men.”47 Any understanding of responsibilization in the context of intimate violence against women must, therefore, also
be informed by feminist insights into the particular vulnerabilities to intimate
violence that arise as a result of power imbalances based on gender. In that vein,
feminist scholars have examined recent neoliberal value shifts and the rise of

44. Ibid at 451.
45. Janine Brodie, Politics on the Margins: Restructuring and the Canadian Women’s Movement
(Halifax: Fernwood, 1995) at 57-58. See also Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays on
Knowledge and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 42. Brown argues
that “neoliberalism equates moral responsibility with rational action” and “in so doing, it
carries responsibility for the self to new heights: the rationally calculating individual bears full
responsibility for the consequences of his or her action no matter how severe the constraints
on this action.”
46. “Affairs of the Heart: Hate Crime and the Politics of Crime Control” (2001) 12:3 Law &
Crit 331 at 337.
47. Elizabeth A Stanko, “Safety Talk: Conceptualizing Women’s Risk Assessment as a
‘Technology of the Soul’” (1997) 1 Theor Criminol 479 at 483.
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responsibilization as it relates to women in the context of sexual assault and
intimate partner violence.48
Nowhere is the tendency towards responsibilization more pervasive than in
the context of sexual assault. Feminist scholars have documented the tendency
both to blame women for the sexual violence they experience and to hold women
responsible for avoiding sexual assault through proper avoidance activities.49
Blaming women for sexual violence has a long history and manifests itself in
numerous ways, such as how the complainant was dressed,50 her past choices of

48. Outside of the criminal law context, see US case law on sexual harassment under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000e-2 (1991). These cases show a similar
trend towards blaming the victim of harassment through its requirement of unwelcomeness
whereby the plaintiff must show that the sexual harassment she experienced was not
welcome. The US Supreme Court has indicated that the plaintiff’s speech and how she
dresses in the workplace are relevant in the assessment of unwelcomeness. See Meritor
Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 106 S Ct 2399 (1986). See also Ann C Juliano, “Did She
Ask for It? The ‘Unwelcome’ Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases” (1991-1992) 77
Cornell L Rev 1558 at 1586 (“Dress is not the only element courts consider when deciding
‘welcomeness.’ A victim’s personality must be pristine enough to demonstrate that she did
not invite the harassment. When courts engage in this inquiry, the plaintiff’s personality is
put on trial.”) See also Christina A Bull, “The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual
Harassment Plaintiff’s Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson”
(1994) 41 UCLA L Rev 117; Sandi Farrell, “Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A
Critique of the Ideology of Voluntarism in Title VII Jurisprudence” (2003) 92 Ky LJ 483;
Grace S Ho, “Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual Harassment
Law Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential” (2008) 20 Yale JL & Feminism 131;
Wendy Pollack, “Sexual Harassment: Women’s Experience vs. Legal Definitions” (1990) 13
Harv Women’s LJ 35.
49. See e.g. Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent,
Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 397 [Randall, “Ideal Victims”]; Lise
Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism on Neoliberal Terrain: The Garneau Sisterhood” in
Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 243 [Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism”];
Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent,” supra note 2; Stanko, supra note 47; Elizabeth
Comack & Tracey Peter, “How the Criminal Justice System Responds to Sexual Assault
Survivors: The Slippage between ‘Responsibilization’ and ‘Blaming the Victim’” (2005) 17:2
CJWL 283; Janine Benedet, “The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women” (2010) 22:2 CJWL
435 [Benedet, “Intoxicated Women”].
50. See e.g. R v Ewanchuk, 1998 ABCA 52, 212 AR 81. In this case, the Alberta Court of Appeal
acquitted an accused of sexual assault in part because the complainant was not dressed in
“a bonnet and crinolines” and because she lived with her boyfriend (ibid at para 4). The
Supreme Court of Canada overruled this decision. See R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330,
169 DLR (4th) 193 [Ewanchuk].
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sexual partners,51 or her mental health history.52 The responsibility for preventing
sexual assault is only a slightly more subtle form of victim blaming: women
are acknowledged as potential victims, but are responsible for taking steps to
avoid that victimization. As Lise Gotell has explained, “[w]ithin the neoliberal
regime of responsibility, populations are divided on the basis of their capacity for
self-management; those women who can be represented as failing to adhere to the
rules of sexual safekeeping are in turn blamed for the violence they experience.”53
Victim blaming makes sexual assault an individualized phenomenon that
depends largely on the behaviour of the complainant. It replaces the notion
of public responsibility for social issues such as violence against women with a
“decontextualized, de-gendered focus on ‘problematic’ individuals.”54 This leads
to what Melanie Randall refers to as “disappearing perpetrators” where, rather
than focusing on the perpetrator himself and the social, political, and economic
contexts that perpetuate male violence against women, attention is focused on
the individual victim.55 Women are divided into good and bad victims: those
deserving of a legal response to violence against them on the one hand, and those
who are perceived as ‘unrapeable,’ such as women with mental disabilities56 or
women involved in prostitution, on the other.57 Racialized and other marginalized women feel this burden disproportionately and are, in turn, deemed less
valuable and less credible when their safety efforts fail; they are thus more likely
to be stigmatized as “bad” or “undeserving” victims.58
Gotell has described the tendency towards risk management and sexual
safekeeping in response to sexual assault as the primary governmental technology
for responding to sexual assault. Sexual assault becomes “something that

51. See e.g. Lise Gotell, “When Privacy Is Not Enough: Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual
History Evidence and the Disclosure of Personal Records” (2006) 43:3 Alta L Rev 743
[Gotell, “When Privacy Is Not Enough”].
52. See Katharine D Kelly, “‘You must be crazy if you think you were raped’: Reflections
on the Use of Complainants’ Personal and Therapy Records in Sexual Assault Trials”
(1997) 9:1 CJWL 178.
53. Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism,” supra note 49 at 257.
54. Randall, “Ideal Victims,” supra note 49 at 409.
55. Ibid at 423. See also Benedet, “Marital Rape,” supra note 3 at 164; Janine Benedet & Isabel
Grant, “Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Power and Authority for Women with Mental
Disabilities” (2014) 22:2 Fem Legal Stud 131.
56. Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with
Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief ” (2007) 52 McGill LJ 243.
57. Randall, “Ideal Victims,” supra note 49 at 409.
58. Ibid at 410.
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individual women should try to avoid.”59 The ideal victim is constituted as “the
rape-preventing subject who exercises appropriate caution (yet fails).”60 As Gotell
notes, “[t]he new ‘ideal’ and valorized victim is a responsible, security conscious,
crime-preventing subject who acts to minimize her own sexual risk.”61 Women
and girls from a young age are taught to negotiate their physical and sexual
safety.62 Avoiding victimization at the hands of men has become a regularized
part of many women’s daily routine.63 Teaching girls and young women to avoid
the ever-present risk of male violence has become so normalized that it is rarely
questioned. For example, women and girls are expected to avoid alcohol, to guard
their drinks vigorously to avoid being drugged, not to dress ‘provocatively,’ not to
walk home at night alone, and never to leave an event with a stranger.64 Virtually
all of these precautions, of course, falsely assume that women are in more danger
from strangers than from people they know.
Historically, the tendency to view male violence against women in intimate
relationships as a private matter between the partners has greatly hindered law
enforcement approaches to intimate partner violence.65 More recently, criminologists have documented the trend towards putting the responsibility for avoiding
intimate partner violence on the victim and her family members.66 Martin
Silverstein and Roberta Spark explore how programs for battered women focus
on having women “increasingly take full responsibility for their well-being even
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.

Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism,” supra note 49 at 245.
Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent,” supra note 2 at 866.
Ibid at 879.
Stanko, supra note 47 at 485, 487; “Truro mom fights school dress code after shorts deemed
too short,” CBC News (13 May 2014) online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/
truro-mom-fights-school-dress-code-after-shorts-deemed-too-short-1.2641525>.
Stanko, supra note 47 at 488.
Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape Activism,” supra note 49 at 252.
See Frances Olsen, “Constitutional law: Feminist critiques of the public/private distinction”
(1993) 10 Const Commentary 319 at 323 (explaining that intimate partner violence has
historically not been vigorously prosecuted because it was seen as a “private” family matter).
See also Catherine Moore, “Women and Domestic Violence: The Public/Private Dichotomy
in International Law” (2003) 7:4 Int’l JHR 93; Jennifer Koshan, “Sounds of Silence:
The Public/Private Dichotomy, Violence, and Aboriginal Women” in Susan B Boyd, ed,
Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1997) at 87.
“Social Bridges Falling Down: Reconstructing a ‘Troublesome Population’ of Battered
Women through Individual Responsibilization Strategies” (2007) 15:4 Crit Criminol 327
(The authors note, “Historically, the responsibility for domestic violence is shifted from the
batterer to the community, from the community to the police, from the police to individual
victims, to family members of victims, and to the community of the victim” at 328).
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as governments take less and less responsibility for making social change affecting
their situation.”67 As a result, they argue, some programs for battered women
present ultimatums to powerless women about how they have to live their lives in
the same way that batterers present ultimatums to their female victims.68 Victims
of intimate partner violence are expected to develop safety plans that give them
strategies for avoiding or escaping from the abuser.69 As Carolyn Hoyle notes,
“victims are made individually accountable–in part, at least–for minimizing the
risk of future violence”70 by developing and sticking with their safety plan. Such
strategies may be useful in a context where there is no relationship between a
perpetrator and victim, but they become much more complex when dealing
with women who have had an intimate relationship with the abuser, particularly
where ongoing access to children is involved.71
The preceding insights about responsibilization, as informed by a gendered
analysis, are useful for examining criminal harassment prosecutions—specifically,
the requirements in section 264 that the Crown prove the complainant was afraid
for her safety or the safety of others, that her fear was reasonable, and that the
accused knew or was reckless with respect to the fact that she was harassed. While
the treatment of female complainants in the criminal harassment context may
not be as dire a situation as we have seen in the context of sexual assault over the
past several decades, there are worrisome similarities. For example, women are
doubted if there is an absence of physical violence or threats thereof.72 There is a
tendency to attribute to women ulterior motives for bringing claims of criminal
harassment, for example, to obtain an advantage in legal proceedings.73 This
67. Ibid at 331.
68. Ibid at 337.
69. Carolyn Hoyle, “Will she be safe? A critical analysis of risk assessment in domestic violence
cases” (2008) 30:3 Child Youth Serv Rev 323 at 331-32.
70. Ibid at 332.
71. Ibid. Hoyle points out that these kinds of measures may be useful when dealing with a crime
like burglary, where the assumption is that victims are rational actors. But, in the context
of intimate partner violence (like with intimate partner criminal harassment), victims are
often emotionally committed to the perpetrator and their choices are restricted by his
controlling behaviours.
72. See e.g. R v E(PJJ), 2003 BCPC 511 at para 34, 2003 CarswellBC 3529 [PJJE]; R v Russo,
2013 ONSC 4730 at para 20, [2013] OJ No 1736 [Russo]; R v Seaton, 2012 ONSC 6070 at
para 18, 104 WCB (2d) 183 [Seaton]; R v MacLean, 2008 ONCJ 30 at para 3, 77 WCB (2d)
211 [MacLean]; R v Esau, [1997] 2 SCR 777 at 789, 812, 148 DLR (4th) 662.
73. See e.g. R v Chancellor, 2012 BCSC 1993 at para 67, [2012] BCJ No 2799 (QL)
[Chancellor]. In this case, Dley J observed that the complainants (the accused’s ex-wife and
her fiancé) had exaggerated their evidence, likely to gain an advantage in ongoing family
litigation over assets and access to the children.
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trend reproduces the tendency in sexual assault law to believe that women bring
claims falsely, contact police, and assert fear where they in fact have none. As
with sexual assault, a woman’s credibility is more likely to be doubted if she has a
previous intimate relationship with her harasser.74
Most notably, there is an expectation that women are responsible for
avoiding criminal harassment and thus must respond to harassment in particular
ways if they want the criminal justice system to acknowledge the crime. Police
and other agencies often tell women complaining of harassment to change their
lives to minimize risk.75 A complainant is told not to frequent locations where the
potential accused might be, to change her route to and from work or home, to
change her phone number or not to take his calls, to install an alarm system, and,
in extreme cases, to leave the jurisdiction.76 It is up to the responsible complainant
to block attempts at harassment even if that requires that she seriously curtail her
daily activities and mobility.77 Sometimes women are faced with contradictory
messages: on the one hand, do not communicate with the accused under any
circumstances. On the other hand, make sure you communicate to him that you
are harassed. If she fails, or chooses not to take such steps, no matter what her
reasons, the seriousness and the very legitimacy of the harassment allegation may
be questioned.78

74. Crocker, supra note 10 at 107-08.
75. Department of Justice Canada, A Handbook for Police and Crown Prosecutors on Criminal
Harassment (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2012) at 25, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/har/EN-CHH2.pdf>.
76. One study concluded that female college students who engage in drinking and drug use
were at greater risk of being stalked than were women who abstain from these behaviours,
implicitly suggesting that that the complainant’s behaviour is responsible for the harassment.
Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine & Richard Tewksbury, “A Routine Activities Theory
Explanation for Women’s Stalking Victimizations” (1999) 5:1 Violence Against Women 43.
77. For this line of reasoning in the sexual assault context, see Gotell, “Third-Wave Anti-rape
Activism,” supra note 49 at 256.
78. For cases in which the court used the complainant’s contact with the accused to acquit, see
R v Moyse, 2010 MBPC 21 at paras 55-56, 252 Man LR (2d) 52 [Moyse]; R v Benoit, 2009
ONCJ 441 at para 11, 84 WCB (2d) 1073 [Benoit]; Seaton, supra note 72 at paras 86-89;
R v Gilmar, 2010 ABPC 332 at para 42, [2010] AJ No 1436 (QL) [Gilmar]; R v W(J),
2010 ONCJ 194 at para 29, 88 WCB (2d) 325 [JW]. For cases in which the accused was
acquitted because the complainant did not communicate that behaviour was harassing, see
R v Frohlich, 2010 ABQB 260 at paras 49-50, 54-55, 495 AR 128 [Frohlich]; R v Ross, 2006
PESCTD 11 at paras 31-32, 256 Nfld & PEIR 25 [Ross]; R v Benjamin, 2010 ONSC 5799
at paras 43-45, 90 WCB (2d) 507 [Benjamin].
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This responsibilization creates the illusion that whether criminal harassment
ceases or escalates depends on the behaviour of the complainant and is not within
the control of the accused. In fact, very little evidence supports the suggestion
that the complainant’s behaviour can have a significant impact on harassment.
In some cases, a particular intervention makes things better. In other cases, the
same intervention makes things worse or makes no difference whatsoever.79
Responsibilization obscures the role of the perpetrator and the state in stopping
the harassment.80

III. THE CASES
A. INTRODUCTION

The data for this study consisted of all trial and appellate decisions available on
Quicklaw, decided between June 1, 2002 and the search date in April, 2013, that
either decided charges of criminal harassment (i.e. conviction or acquittal), or
pronounced sentence for accused persons who pled guilty or were found guilty of

79. Social science studies substantiate the unpredictability of how a perpetrator will respond
to different interventions. The results tend to show that different legal responses, for
example seeking a no contact order, sometimes reduce the harassment for a victim of
criminal harassment, while other times they make it worse. It is plausible to suggest that
the complainant may often be in the best position to know what kinds of responses will
antagonize her abuser. See e.g. Dutton & Winstead, supra note 11 at 1135. They state,
“Thus, research indicates that some of the responses work some of the time, but no particular
response is effective all (or most) of the time. Some research suggests that no responses
are effective.”
80. A similar trend towards responsibilization can be seen in the social science literature. Social
scientists have studied what types of behaviours women should engage in to minimize the
impact of criminal harassment. See e.g. Dutton & Winstead, supra note 11; Goldsworthy
& Raj, supra note 19. Goldsworthy & Raj describe women as engaging in “[r]einforcing
behaviours such as picking up the phone after the stalker has attempted to call 40 times
in a row” (ibid at 185). Different victim typologies have been developed to categorize how
women respond to criminal harassment, deeming some responses to be more appropriate
than others, even though there is no established response to criminal harassment that stops
the harassment with even a majority of perpetrators (ibid at 185-86; Dutton & Winstead,
supra note 11 at 1131-32).
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criminal harassment at trial. A total of 348 decisions met these criteria.81 Many
of them also involved charges other than criminal harassment. As this article is
focused on intimate partner criminal harassment, the cases were separated into
two groups. The first group includes all cases in which a complainant had had an
“intimate relationship” with the accused. This term is defined broadly to include
marital, common law, and dating relationships. This group includes cases in
which the harassment arose out of an intimate relationship, even if other people
were also harassed (e.g., where the accused harassed both his former intimate
partner and her new partner). Of the 348 cases, 199 (57%) were classified as
intimate partner cases, and all but one involved heterosexual relationships. The
second group consisted of cases in which the relationship between the accused
and complainant was not one of current or former intimate partnership. Into this
group fell 101 cases (29%). A further 48 cases (14%) in which it was not possible
to determine the relationship between the parties were eliminated from the
sample. While the study is mainly qualitative and does not present any statistical
analysis, a few quantitative comments about the overall findings are useful.
While there is no way to determine whether these cases constitute a representative sample of criminal harassment cases, these findings are remarkably consistent
with larger government studies on criminal harassment.82 In the overall sample,
93% of accused were men and 81% of complainants were women. However, the
gender breakdown was more distinct in the intimate partner cases, with 96%
of the accused being men (as compared to 87% in the non-intimate partner
group). In these cases, 92% of complainants were women, as compared to 68%
of complainants in the non-intimate partner cases. These findings support the

81. The cases were found by searching the LexisNexis Quicklaw database for all cases with the
search string “crim! /5 harass!” decided after May 2002. This date was chosen because it was
the end date of the search conducted for the last study on this topic. See Grant, Bone &
Grant, supra note 8. In Quicklaw, this search string produces all cases in which any word
beginning with “crim” is found within 5 words of any word beginning with “harass.” This
search string produced 1252 cases in late April 2013. Approximately two-thirds of the cases
were eliminated from the sample as they were either civil, family, or some other kind of
case that simply happened to mention those words, or because they were a criminal case in
which the words were mentioned for some reason other than a trial, appeal, or sentencing
proceeding. Four French-language decisions that turned up in the sample were also excluded,
for reasons of consistency.
82. See e.g. Shelly Milligan, Statistics Canada, Juristat Bulletin Article: Criminal Harassment
in Canada, 2009 (Ottawa: StatCan, 2011) at 3, online: <www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85005-x/2011001/article/11407-eng.pdf>; Statistics Canada, Family Violence, supra
note 30 at 35-37.
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suggestion that intimate partner criminal harassment in particular is a highly
gendered crime that is predominantly committed by men against women.
The overall conviction rate across all cases was approximately 71%. The
conviction rate was higher in the non-intimate partner group (72.3%) as
compared to the intimate partner group (69.8%).83 When the conviction rate
was broken down by gender and relationship, male intimate partner accused were
more likely to be convicted than female intimate partner accused (70.2% versus
62.5%). In the non-intimate partner group, the opposite pattern was evident—
women were more likely to be convicted (76.9% versus 71.6% for men). In both
groups, the number of female accused was so small that it is difficult to draw any
conclusions from the differences in conviction rate by gender.
In almost one-third of the intimate partner cases, the accused was under a
no contact order at the time the criminal harassment took place, highlighting the
ineffectiveness of such orders. In intimate partner cases where the accused had
some sort of no contact order with respect to the complainant, the conviction
rate was almost 86%, significantly higher than the average. This pattern was
even more striking for women accused where 100% of those under some form
of no contact order were convicted. Again, it is difficult to draw conclusions,
as the numbers are very small, with only four women under pre-existing no
contact orders.
In the vast majority of intimate partner cases, the accused harasses someone
of the opposite sex. In one case involving same-sex intimate partner criminal
harassment, the accused harassed his former male partner.84 In the other eight
intimate partner cases involving accused persons and complainants of the same
gender (five male accused and three female accused), the harassment was directed
83. While this conviction rate appears significantly higher than that usually cited for sexual
assault (most statistics suggest the conviction rate for sexual assault is below 50%), it is
important to note that the figures presented in this article only include cases where written
judgments were issued. Thus, it is impossible to compare these numbers with statistics
based on charges laid or even all cases that have gone to trial. See Mia Dauvergne, Statistics
Canada, Adult Criminal Court Statistics in Canada, 2010/2011 (Ottawa: StatCan, 28
May 2012) at 25.
84. See R v Wenc, 2009 ABCA 328, 460 AR 366. This case involved a man who criminally
harassed his former male partner after their relationship ended. The accused was sentenced
to 90 days intermittent imprisonment. The Court of Appeal indicated that 12 months
imprisonment would have been an appropriate sentence, but it did not grant leave to appeal
because the accused had served his sentence. It is unclear whether police are less likely to lay
charges in same-sex intimate partner harassment or whether police are less likely to become
involved initially. This would be a fruitful avenue of further research as part of the study of
violence in same-sex intimate relationships.
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at the new partner of the former intimate partner.85 In all but one case where
harassment was directed at a new partner, the former intimate partner was also
a complainant.86
An initial objective of this study was to compare the judicial treatment of
male and female accused in intimate partner criminal harassment cases. However,
it is extremely difficult to draw any conclusions from the female accused cases.
There are only eight women accused of intimate partner harassment in the
database. Five of those eight decisions are sentencing decisions in which the
elements of the offence, such as reasonable fear and mens rea, have already been
established beyond a reasonable doubt.87 The three trial decisions all resulted in
acquittals.88 In one of these cases, R v Blohm, the charge appeared to be unsubstantiated.89 The trial judge found that none of the elements of the actus reus could
be made out as the accused had not engaged in any of the enumerated harassing
conduct or caused fear. The male complainant had locked the accused out of
her home (and denied her access to her possessions) when she was away visiting
her grandchildren, forcing her to stay in a shelter on her return. There was no
evidence that she had harassed the female complainant (the male complainant’s
new girlfriend), nor that she had come to the house knowing that the female
complainant would be there.
The other two cases involved women seeking access to their children, who
were in the midst of custody disputes with their male partners. In R v Harper, the
accused was convicted of a number of charges relating to mischief and obstructing
the police. Nevertheless, she was acquitted of criminal harassment because the
level of distress she caused her husband when she drove by his house and made
obscene gestures was insufficient.90 There was no discussion of the details of the
husband’s response to the harassment, nor of whether he responded reasonably.
85. R v Blohm, 2011 NSPC 51, [2011] NSJ No 440 (QL) [Blohm]; R v Prakash, 2009 ONCJ
197, [2009] OJ No 1928 (QL) [Prakash]; Chancellor, supra note 73; R v O’Reilly, [2006] NJ
No 214 (QL) (Prov Ct); R v Ibrahim, 2011 ONSC 4252, [2011] OJ No 3331(QL), aff’d
2014 ONCA 355, 113 WCB (2d) 506; R v Zgraggen (2011), 101 WCB (2d) 648, [2011] OJ
No 4556 (QL) (Ct J); R v Smysniuk, 2007 SKQB 453, 306 Sask R 270; R v Bachmaier, 2010
ONCJ 11, [2009] OJ No 5761 (QL) [Bachmaier].
86. Ibid.
87. R v Hrabanek, [2005] AJ No 1941 (QL), 2005 CarswellAlta 2697 [Hrabanek]; R v Marsden,
2004 BCPC 369, [2004] BCJ No 2112 (QL); Prakash, supra note 85; R v Shaw, 2012 ABPC
273, [2012] AJ No 1024 (QL); R v Porter, 2002 BCPC 641, 2002 CarswellBC 3388.
88. Blohm, supra note 85; R v Harper, 2007 ONCJ 125, 76 WCB (2d) 440 [Harper]; R v KAM,
2002 SKPC 105, 55 WCB (2d) 670 [KAM].
89. Blohm, supra note 85.
90. Harper, supra note 88 at para 47.
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In R v KAM, the accused had been trying to establish contact with her children
whom she had not seen for 8 months.91 The trial judge believed that her only
purpose in repeatedly leaving messages for the complainant was to contact her
children through her former spouse.
Overall, there were not enough cases from which to draw general conclusions.
While there may be stereotypes about men responding to female violence, I was
unable to find evidence of the discourse of responsibilization in the cases dealing
with the elements of the offence.92 The cases did not reveal any conception of
how a reasonable man responds to harassment by a female former partner.
B. EXAMINING JUDICIAL DISCOURSES

Looking at reported decisions, of course, does not give one a complete picture of
criminal harassment cases in Canada. In a majority of cases, charges are probably
never laid. Many charges are dropped, sometimes in exchange for the accused
entering into a no contact order. Many charges of criminal harassment that do
proceed are resolved by guilty pleas.93 In some cases, behaviour that could be
considered criminal harassment may be charged as assault, uttering threats, or
some other crime. Such cases are not identified as a criminal harassment case.
Nonetheless, the present sample does give an indication of how judges are dealing
with the cases that get to trial, and of the attitudes that inform their decisions. As
such, the case analysis in this article is more a study of judicial attitudes towards
intimate partner criminal harassment than of the phenomenon of criminal
harassment itself.
As Gotell has demonstrated in the context of sexual assault, judicial
discourses are an important site for the reconstruction of normative heterosexuality and sexual citizenship.94 Thus, “scrutinizing judicial discourses reveals both
the shifting terms upon which the ‘good victim’ is defined and a changing set

91. KAM, supra note 88 at para 46.
92. See Hrabanek, supra note 87 at para 5. In Hrabanek, the court suggested that the
complainant should not have continued contact with the accused (i.e., he met her for
coffee on more than one occasion). What is interesting is that the trial judge said it was
nonetheless obvious that the male complainant was afraid and that anybody would have
been afraid because of the complainant’s persistence. Thus, the ongoing contact did not
negate his fear. Further, making this observation in sentencing has a very different impact
given that the accused has already been convicted and the elements of criminal harassment
already established.
93. Gill & Brockman, supra note 31 at 34.
94. Gotell, “The Discursive Disappearance,” supra note 2 at 132-33.

573

(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

of justifications for disqualifying claims of sexual violence.”95 In the context of
criminal harassment, these discourses both shape and reflect how the “responsible
victim” of criminal harassment is constructed.96 The power of judicial discourses
can also act to silence women who encounter the law.97 This is especially true
of those women who do not comply with the construction of the “responsible
victim.” Decisions that embody these discourses signal to men that they are
not criminally responsible for instilling fear if, for example, their ex-partner
occasionally agrees to see them or responds to their texts or communications.
Such discourses may also affect women’s choices, either in how they respond
to harassment or whether they report it to police, potentially exposing them to
greater danger.
The central claim of this article is that the elements of criminal harassment
as defined in section 264, specifically the requirements that the complainant be
reasonably fearful and that the accused know that he is harassing her, lead judges
to put the onus on women to prevent intimate partner criminal harassment and
to behave like ‘proper victims.’ Given my focus on the elements of the offence,
trial decisions and appeals therefrom were generally more useful than sentencing
decisions. Other aspects of criminal harassment under section 264 may also
create barriers to prosecution, such as the requirement that harassing behaviour
take place repeatedly.98 I focus, however, on the fear requirement and the mens rea
requirement (the accused’s knowledge) because problematic assumptions about
how women should respond to harassment arise most often in these elements.
In Part III(C), below, I turn first to the requirements that the woman
be afraid and that her fear be reasonable, and then examine the requirement
that the accused know he is harassing the complainant (the mens rea element).
For each of these elements, there are numerous examples of judges expecting
women to behave in particular ways that either illustrate societal expectations of
a frightened woman or place the responsibility on her to make sure the accused
knows that he is harassing her. Evidence of this trend is not found in every
case, nor necessarily in a majority of cases. However, as the following cases will
95. Ibid at 135.
96. See also Carissima Mathen, “Crowdsourcing Sexual Objectification” (2014) 3:3 Laws 529
at 542. Mathen discusses the expressive role that criminal law plays in society generally. In
playing this expressive role, “it gives effect to broader intuitions about criminal wrongdoing,
and it shapes and transmits crucial benchmarks by which citizens may guide their behaviour.”
97. Carol Smart, Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism (London: Sage
Publications, 1995) at 71.
98. Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 264(2). For example, two of the four types of behaviour listed
in s 264(2) must be performed repeatedly before liability attaches.
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demonstrate, it is present often enough to raise concerns about the elements
of criminal harassment and the judicial interpretation thereof. One can only
speculate about the number of charges that were not laid or that never proceeded
to trial because police or prosecutors employed similar logic, or because women
are deterred altogether from going to police because they know they will not be
construed as an ideal victim.
C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTIMATE PARTNER CRIMINAL HARASSMENT
CASES: THE JUDICIAL DISCOURSE OF RESPONSIBILIZATION
1.

REASONABLE FEAR FOR ONE’S SAFETY OR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS

Section 264(1) requires that the Crown prove that the accused caused the
complainant “reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for [her] safety or
the safety of anyone known to [her].”99 This requirement has both a subjective
component, which asks whether the complainant actually felt afraid for her safety,
and an objective component, which asks whether that fear was reasonable “in all
the circumstances.” The requirement that the complainant be afraid means that
women will have to testify about their fear and be subject to cross-examination
regarding its honesty and its reasonableness. Where the accused is unrepresented by counsel, he will likely conduct that cross-examination himself.100
This reasonable fear requirement may also expose the complainant’s character
and mental health history to challenge, creating the potential for further abuse
by the accused.101
While most judges recognize, at least in theory, that the well-established
judicial interpretation of “safety” includes psychological or emotional safety as

99. Ibid, s 264(1).
100. Birenbaum & Grant, supra note 22. This problem has been acknowledged in the sexual
assault context. Section 486.3(1) enables the Crown or a witness to apply to prevent
an accused cross-examining a witness under 18 years of age and s 486.3(2) allows the
judge to order that the accused shall not personally cross-examine any witness if it would
impede obtaining a full and candid account of her evidence. The judge should consider
her age, whether she has a disability, the nature of the offence, and the nature of the
relationship between the witness and the accused. See Criminal Code, supra note 3, ss
486.1(3), 486.3(1)-(2).
101. Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11 at 105. There were no cases in this sample where
the record was clear that an application had been made for access to psychiatric records of
the complainant.
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well as physical safety,102 the threshold for psychological safety established in
the case law is extremely high and inevitably involves difficult line drawing.103
For example, it is not uncommon for judges to state that it is insufficient if the
complainant is “vexed, disquieted or annoyed”; rather, she must be “tormented,
troubled, worried continually or chronically, plagued, bedevilled and badgered.”104
In several cases, the court found the complainant to be annoyed and stressed, but
not sufficiently annoyed and stressed.105 In one such example, the accused sent
sexually explicit photographs of the complainant to her employer and several
other people, while the complainant went on disability leave from work, took
prescription medication, and received counselling. The court, relying on the test
for psychological safety above, concluded that the impact on her was vexing and
annoying, but not disturbing enough.106 In other cases, the issue of psychological
safety is not expressly considered and criminal harassment charges are rejected
because there were no threats of violence or physical harm to the complainant.107
The burden of proof is of course on the Crown to establish, through the
complainant, both the fear and its reasonableness. Yet there is no inquiry into
the reasonableness of the accused’s harassing actions. Judges interrogate how
the complainant responded to the harassment: did she take steps to avoid the
accused,108 did she alter her life so as to prevent the possibility of harassment,109
did she avoid taking any actions that might be interpreted as inconsistent with

102. See e.g. R v Goodwin (1997), 89 BCAC 269 at para 14, 34 WCB (2d) 408 (CA); R v
Vandoodeward (2009), 86 WCB (2d) 89, [2009] OJ No 5099 (QL) at paras 72-73 (Sup Ct);
R v Korbut, 2012 ONCJ 522 at para 25, [2012] OJ No 3895 (QL).
103. See PJJE, supra note 72 at para 37. The judge explicitly recognized the fineness of the
distinction: “It may be more accurate to say that the Accused’s conduct caused her a great
deal of stress and it may be splitting hairs to say that it was stress rather than fear that
she was feeling.”
104. See e.g. R v Greenberg, 2010 ONSC 3584 at para 101, [2010] OJ No 3934 (QL) [Greenberg].
105. See e.g. R v Gibb, [2005] OJ No 3057 at para 64 (QL) (Ct J) [Gibb]; JW, supra note
78 at para 30; R v Hassan, [2009] OJ No 1378 (QL), 2009 CanLII 15447 at para 31
(Sup Ct) [Hassan].
106. See e.g. ibid. In Hassan, the trial judge applied this test and found that the threat to distribute
sexually explicit photos of the complainant was vexing and annoying but did not meet the
standard required by s 264.
107. See e.g. PJJE, supra note 72 at para 38; Russo, supra note 72 at para 75; MacLean, supra
note 72 at para 9.
108. Moyse, supra note 78 at paras 85-86; Gilmar, supra note 78 at para 42.
109. Moyse, supra note 78 at para 87.
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fear,110 did she communicate to him the fact that his conduct was harassing,111
did she complain to the police promptly enough,112 did she seek a no contact
order,113 and was the harassment objectively “bad enough” to allow us to label
her fear as reasonable and the harassment as criminal?114 As in sexual assault law,
judges are assessing a woman’s response to a highly traumatic series of events
and determining whether that response is adequate for acknowledgement by
the criminal justice system. Judges make assumptions about how one should
respond to what may have been a persistent, ongoing course of harassment by
someone with whom the complainant may share children and a long history.
For example, the fact that a woman does not contact police immediately may
be used to discredit her allegations, even though there may be numerous reasons
for trying to resolve problems with a former intimate partner without immediate

110. R v Monahan, 2010 SKPC 46 at para 77, 194 ACWS (3d) 1124 [Monahan].
111. Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 54-56; Moyse, supra note 78 at paras 85, 91; Benoit, supra
note 78 at para 11; Seaton, supra note 72 at para 87.
112. Chancellor, supra note 73 at paras 77, 85. The fact that some women may not report criminal
harassment immediately to police, and the tendency of courts to use that fact to cast doubt
on her fear, can be analogized to the recent complaint doctrine that has plagued sexual assault
complaints. While this doctrine was statutorily repealed in 1983, as Elaine Craig points out,
the myths and stereotypes on which the doctrine is based are still prevalent in sexual assault
prosecutions. See Elaine Craig, “The Relevance of Delayed Disclosure to Complainant
Credibility in Cases of Sexual Assault” (2011) 36:2 Queen’s LJ 551. In sexual assault cases,
a failure to report a sexual assault promptly is used to suggest that a woman is fabricating
her allegations. In criminal harassment, the same kinds of problematic assumptions are used
primarily to cast doubt on the alleged fear and distress experienced by the complainant.
In both contexts, assumptions and stereotypes have developed about how women should
respond to male violence. Women are disbelieved if they fail to live up to these stereotypical
expectations (see ibid at 555-56). See also Elizabeth Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on
Trial (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) at 241. Sheehy notes in her work on battered women,
if we only believe women who complain to police or friends about abuse, the most seriously
abused women will be eliminated because these are the women who never go to police.
113. See e.g. R v Wease, [2008] OJ No 1938 at para 23 (QL), 78 WCB (2d) 381 (Sup Ct) [Wease].
In Wease, the complainant’s fear was doubted because she did not seek a no contact order
even though she did contact police. See also Ross, supra note 78 at para 39.
114. PJJE, supra note 72 at paras 38, 41; R v MDP, 2005 BCPC 288 at para 34, [2005] BCJ No
1615 (QL) [MDP]; Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 50, 75.
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police involvement.115 Some women expressed the concern, for example, that if
they contacted the police, the accused’s behaviour would escalate.116
In the present study, there were 57 acquittals in the 193 intimate partner cases
involving male accused. Of the 57 acquittals, more than half (33 cases) were based
on some aspect of the complainant’s fear being inadequate: the complainant was
not afraid, her fear was not reasonable, or both.117 In an earlier study of the criminal
harassment provisions, Isabel Grant, Natasha Bone, and Kathy Grant found that
courts were likely to conclude that a woman was subjectively afraid.118 Thus in
the current study, I expected to find that in most cases where repeated harassment
was found, the subjective fear component would be found to be satisfied and
the question would then be whether the fear was reasonable. To the contrary,
the current study found that the subjective component of the fear creates more
problems for complainants than the reasonableness requirement. In 21 intimate
partner cases, the court concluded that the complainant was not subjectively

115. Chancellor, supra note 73 at paras 77, 85.
116. See e.g. R v Mustaka, 2006 BCPC 174 at para 7, [2006] BCWLD 4919 [Mustaka]. There
is much social science evidence demonstrating that the decision for women to involve
the police in issues of intimate partner violence or threats is complex. See e.g. Betty Jo
Barrett, Melissa St Pierre & Nadine Vaillancourt, “Police Response to Intimate Partner
Violence in Canada: Do Victim Characteristics Matter?” (2011) 21:1 Women & Crim J
38; Caroline Akers & Catherine Kaukinen, “The Police Reporting Behavior of Intimate
Partner Violence Victims” (2009) 24:3 J Fam Viol 159. It should be noted that s 264(4)
makes it an aggravating factor in sentencing if the accused was in violation of a protective
order at the time of the harassment. This demonstrates that a no contact order should not be
seen as a requirement of establishing criminal harassment, but rather as a factor that makes
the harassment even more serious where it is present. Where the harassment exists in the
context of a no contact order, a lower threshold of mens rea and of fear on the part of the
complainant should be required.
117. This reasonableness requirement attached to the fear was the subject of much early criticism.
See Cairns Way, supra note 10 at 396; Grant, Bone & Grant, supra note 8 at 203-04.
118. Ibid at 196.
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afraid for her safety.119 In 15 cases, her fear was labelled unreasonable,120 and this
finding was often made without analysis following a finding of no subjective
fear.121 Women asserted fear in these cases but were disbelieved.

119. R v Carter, [2004] OJ No 5167 at para 9 (QL), 67 WCB (2d) 279 (Sup Ct) [Carter]
(the court suggested that the trial judge erred in failing to assess the credibility of the
complainant’s evidence regarding her fear); Gibb, supra note 105 at para 64; R v Vanin,
2006 SKPC 86, 287 Sask R 58 at paras 62-64 [Vanin]; R v Lincoln, 2008 ONCJ 14 at paras
24-26, 77 WCB (2d) 104 [Lincoln]; R v Lukaniuk, 2009 ONCJ 21 at para 17, 81 WCB (2d)
517 [Lukaniuk]; Hassan, supra note 105 at para 31; Gilmar, supra note 78 at para 42; JW,
supra note 78 at para 30; Moyse, supra note 78 at para 91; Monahan, supra note 110 at para
77; R v Barkho, 2011 ONCJ 543 at para 48, [2011] OJ No 4949 (QL) [Barkho]; Blohm,
supra note 85 at para 44; Chancellor, supra note 73 at paras 69, 92; Ross, supra note 78 at
para 32; Wease, supra note 113 at para 23 (the court questioned the complainant’s fear as she
did not seek a no contact order); R v Lenser, [2003] OJ No 3617 at para 28 (QL), 59 WCB
(2d) 141 (Ct J) [Lenser]; R v Wolfe, 2008 BCPC 119 at paras 44-45, [2008] BCWLD 4044
[Wolfe]; Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 66, 75; R v Victoria-Penuela, 2011 ONCJ 572 at
paras 118-119, [2011] OJ No 5130 (QL) [Victoria-Penuela]; Russo, supra note 72 at para 75;
Greenberg, supra note 104.
120. PJJE, supra note 72 at para 41; MDP, supra note 114 at para 34; R v V(T), 2006 ONCJ 338
at para 144, [2006] OJ No 4089 (QL) [TV]; Benoit, supra note 78 at para 11; Bachmaier,
supra note 85 at para 60; R v Nkony, 2010 BCPC 73 at para 73, [2010] BCWL 7606
[Nkony]; R v Benedict, [2003] OJ No 4300 at para 25 (QL), 59 WCB (2d) 288 (Ct J)
[Benedict]; Benjamin, supra note 78 at para 44; Lenser, supra note 119 at para 28; Wolfe, supra
note 119 at para 44; Frohlich, supra note 78 at para 75; Victoria-Penuela, supra note 119 at
para 119; Russo, supra note 72 at para 75; MacLean, supra note 72 at para 12; Seaton, supra
note 72 at para 88.
121. In 16 cases the court concluded only that the complainant was not subjectively afraid. See
Carter, supra note 119 at para 9 (the court suggested that the trial judge erred in failing
to assess the credibility of the complainant’s evidence regarding her fear); Gibb, supra note
105 at para 64; Vanin, supra note 119 at paras 62-63; Lincoln, supra note 119 at para 25;
Lukaniuk, supra note 119 at para 17; Hassan, supra note 105 at para 31; Gilmar, supra note
78 at para 44; JW, supra note 78 at para 30; Moyse, supra note 78 at para 91; Monahan, supra
note 110 at para 77; Greenberg, supra note 104 at para 101; Barkho, supra note 119 at para
48; Blohm, supra note 85 at para 44; Chancellor, supra note 73 at para 69; Ross, supra note 78
at paras, 32, 39; Wease, supra note 113 at para 23 (the court questioned the complainant’s
fear as she did not seek a no contact order). In 9 cases any fear was found to be unreasonable:
PJJE, supra note 72 at paras 38, 41; MDP, supra note 114 at para 34; Benoit, supra note 78
at para 11; Bachmaier, supra note 85 at para 60; Nkony, supra note 120 at para 73; Benedict,
supra note 120 at para 25; Benjamin, supra note 78 at para 44; MacLean, supra note 72 at
para 12; Seaton, supra note 72 at para 89. In 6 cases, the complainant was found not to have
any fear, but if she did, it was unreasonable. See TV, supra note 120 at para 144; Wolfe, supra
note 119 at para 44; Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 72, 75; Victoria-Penuela, supra note 119
at paras 118, 119; Russo, supra note 72 at para 75; Lenser, supra note 119 at para 28.
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i.

THE SUBJECTIVE COMPONENT: SHE WASN’T AFRAID

The complainant’s behaviour is a significant factor in the judicial analysis of
whether she felt sufficiently fearful. In several cases, the judge’s conclusion that
the complainant was not subjectively afraid was based, at least in part, on finding
that her conduct was inconsistent with what was expected of a fearful woman. For
example, in R v Monahan, the complainant testified that she was fearful because
the accused was following her.122 She testified that she sometimes drove by the
accused’s house to look for his vehicle so that she would not have to check for
his vehicle hiding somewhere on her way home. She indicated that she did this
on the suggestion of the police.123 The judge disbelieved her testimony about her
fear, finding that “[i]f she had truly feared for her safety it is difficult to imagine
why she would follow [the accused] from time to time as she did. These actions
are not consistent with someone experiencing fear.”124 Here the judge assumed
that there is one standard response to fear, and that departures from that standard
are fatal to successful prosecution. This view ignores the sense of loss of control
that women who are repeatedly harassed often experience. Knowing where his
car was could help re-establish some sense of control over a situation that felt
uncontrollable–what Stark refers to as “control in the context of no control.”125
In R v JW, the court employed similar reasoning to find that the complainant
did not subjectively fear the accused.126 The complainant, only about 13 years old
at the time of the offence, was the accused’s ex-girlfriend. The accused, who was
16, could not accept the end of the relationship. She alleged that he threatened
to kill her new boyfriend, continued to follow her home from school, continued
to call her house, and attempted to put his hands down her pants. The accused
was convicted of assault and uttering death threats but acquitted of criminal
harassment. Justice Kenkel accepted that the accused repeatedly contacted the
complainant and that, on one occasion, he refused to leave her home when
asked.127 However, much was made of the fact that the complainant met with
the accused twice during the period when he continued to pursue her. This fact
gave the judge a reasonable doubt about her fear.128 The judge described the
teenaged complainant as follows: “While she plainly found the accused annoying
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Monahan, supra note 110 at para 1.
Ibid at para 24.
Ibid at para 77.
Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 19 at 17.
JW, supra note 78.
Ibid at paras 6, 8, 28.
Ibid at para 30.
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at times and was fearful as a result of some of his statements, she continued to
seek him out, perhaps enjoying the intense attention even if it was the wrong
kind of attention.”129 Reminiscent of the persistent mythology in sexual assault
that women invite and secretly desire sexual violence,130 the judge accepted that
she was fearful, but then negated that fear because of her behaviour. It is simply
not possible to demonstrate how a 13-year-old girl ‘should’ demonstrate fear
as a result of harassment, death threats to her new boyfriend, and other related
behaviour from the accused.
In R v Moyse,131 the judge found that the complainant was not afraid in
part because she continued contact with the accused. The accused had contacted
her on the pretence of getting his property back. The judge reasoned that the
complainant could have returned the property if she was fearful of him as a way
to reduce legitimate contact.132 The judge suggested that “[t]his is inconsistent
and unexplained behaviour of someone who is fearful.”133 He also stated that
if there had been genuine fear for her safety, she would have “organize[d] her
life” to ensure no contact with the accused.134 The ongoing contact problem is
a common theme in these cases. While many women do organize their lives
around avoiding their harassers, this should not be a de facto element of the
offence. Judges seemingly do not understand why a woman would have contact
with someone she feared. There is no recognition that she might think she could
resolve the situation by talking to the accused, that fear can coexist with other

129. Ibid. See also Gilmar, supra note 78 at paras 42-44. In that case, no fear was found
because the complainant continued to have contact with the accused. See also Russo, supra
note 72 at para 75.
130. See e.g. Randall, “Ideal Victims,” supra note 49 at 420.
131. Moyse, supra note 78.
132. Ibid at para 91. The complainant’s reaction was also found wanting in MacLean. See supra
note 72 at paras 5, 9. In that case, the accused repeatedly called his ex-wife, allegedly for the
purpose of speaking to his sons, but often leaving hateful messages on her voicemail. The
complainant testified that she was afraid for her safety, believing that “the defendant was
unstable and that something would happen.” She spent the night at a friend’s home out of
fear after she went to the police. The judge rejected her testimony as to her fear because “her
sworn statement to vary the custody order, made only days before she went to the police,
[did] not expressly assert this” and because the judge disagreed with her that one of the calls
that she found disturbing contained a sexual innuendo. Although the judge was satisfied that
the complainant was “psychologically disturbed” and “emotionally” distressed, the judge was
not convinced that she feared for her physical safety.
133. Moyse, supra note 78 at para 55.
134. Ibid at para 86. Even though contact was likely given the nature of their jobs, the
complainant was a Crown counsel and the accused was a police officer.
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feelings towards the accused, or that fear of a former intimate partner may
manifest itself differently than fear of a stranger.
Sometimes trial judges rely on an absence of violence to reject the notion
that the complainant was subjectively afraid for her safety, even though courts
have repeatedly acknowledged that fear for one’s psychological safety is sufficient
under section 264. In R v Russo, the accused had sexually groomed and sexually
exploited the complainant beginning when she was about 14 years old and he
was 59 years old.135 The complainant had a history of sexual abuse by a number of
men and was living in poverty when she met the accused. The accused stayed in
her life even after she married and had children. She eventually brought charges
of criminal harassment when he refused to leave her family alone. The trial judge
acquitted the accused of criminal harassment and a number of other charges,
unconvinced that the complainant had feared for her safety. Although she had
testified that she was afraid, the judge found that the accused had never behaved
violently towards the complainant or her family. The judge used this conclusion,
as well as the fact that the complainant felt some sympathy towards the accused,
to reject the complainant’s evidence that she was afraid of him.136
A complainant’s failure to seek a no contact order is also considered in
deciding whether she was truly afraid. In R v Wease, a complainant’s fear was
doubted because she did not seek a no contact order against her husband, even
though she did go to police to complain about his behaviour.137 The accused
and the complainant were involved in divorce proceedings. He was convicted
of criminal harassment at trial after following her and taking pictures of her
vehicle. The conviction was overturned on summary appeal, with the court
stating that, “There is no explanation given as to why, if the complainant was
fearful and concerned as to her own emotional or physical well-being, she did
not pursue a restraining order in the Family Court proceedings.”138 In R v Ross,
the accused was acquitted of criminal harassment because the trial judge found
that the complainant’s fear was equivocal.139 This conclusion was based, in part,
on the fact that it took her a significant period of time before she sought a no
135. Russo, supra note 72 at para 3.
136. Ibid at para 75. The court also found that any fear would be unreasonable. See also
Chancellor, supra note 73 at paras 64-69. In that case, the complainants were the accused’s
ex-wife and her fiancé. The judge concluded that there had been no overt threats of physical
violence and that the fiancé’s conduct was inconsistent with his alleged fear of the accused;
for example, the complainants did not immediately go to the police.
137. Wease, supra note 113 at para 22.
138. Ibid at para 23.
139. Ross, supra note 78 at para 39.
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contact order: roughly 2 weeks after the accused had assaulted her. The onus was
clearly placed on the complainant in these cases to take the initiative to stop the
harassment. The underlying (false) assumption is that no contact orders put an
end to the accused’s harassing behaviour.
As one might expect, where the complainant does take steps to act like the
responsible victim, courts are more likely to find she was afraid. For example, in
R v Fader,140 the court explicitly acknowledged that the complainant took steps
to secure her safety and communicate to the accused that the relationship was
over.141 In R v Malakpour,142 the fact that the complainant avoided going out,
avoided making friends, and purchased a condominium because of its increased
security all contributed to the finding of subjective fear.
In a number of cases, the judge stated that the complainant was afraid, but
that the fear did not necessarily relate to her psychological or physical safety. In
other words, she had the wrong type of fear. For example, in R v Gibb,143 during
the divorce proceedings of the accused and the complainant, the accused was
repeatedly holding demonstrations with others about the state of family law in a
park adjacent to the home of the complainant. On several occasions, anywhere
from 6–10 protesters were dressed as judges, carrying signs, and protesting. One
of them carried a sign saying “judges kill families.”144 The accused also carried a
sign with the names of his children on it and his assertion that he loved them.
The complainant changed her route to and from home and avoided going to
the park for walks or bike rides. Although the judge found that there was some
evidence as to the complainant’s fear, including her use of the words “scary” and
“nervous,” her installation of an alarm system in her home, and her being upset
and crying when the police attended at her home, the judge concluded that she
“never articulated expressly that she was in fear for her safety or the safety of
her children.”145

140. R v Fader, 2009 BCPC 61, [2009] BCWLD 4791.
141. Ibid at paras 8, 25.
142. R v Malakpour, 2007 BCPC 431 at paras 5-6, 18, [2008] BCWLD 2112, rev’d on other
grounds 2008 BCCA 326, 258 BCAC 154 [Malakpour].
143. Gibb, supra note 105.
144. Ibid at para 13. Susan Boyd has documented how the fathers’ rights movement has
downplayed the significance of intimate partner violence in its rhetoric about custody
disputes. See Susan B Boyd, “Demonizing Mothers: Fathers’ Rights Discourses in Child
Custody Law Reform Processes” (2004) 6:1 J Assoc for Research on Mothering 52 at 61.
145. Gibb, supra note 105 at para 61.
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In a particularly problematic decision, R v Lincoln, the accused left five
insulting and threatening phone messages for his ex-girlfriend.146 He threatened
to go to her workplace and contact her family members because she had not
returned a ring he had given her. His final message to her stated:
I’m going to show you what kind of person I can be. You messed around with the
wrong person… . You have no idea what I am capable of doing. And you are going
to start seeing slowly but surely I am going to affect you in every single way there is
in life. You can run away but I can find you. You can move to Jerusalem but I can
still find you. That’s what I do as a living. And I will find you. So, I will give you
the best advice. Give [sic] my ring. That’s the only advice I have for you. And very
shortly I will be finding your Mom, where they live. And nobody can stop me. Have
a good day. Rest in peace.147

The complainant testified that “rest in peace” in her mind referred to death.148
Despite these not-so-subtle threats of serious harm, the trial judge concluded
that the complainant was not subjectively fearful. The judge held that if the
complainant had feared, her fear would have been reasonable, and found that
the complainant “felt threatened by the messages” and that they “made her feel
sick.”149 However, the judge concluded that she had not explicitly said that the
“threat was to her safety, as opposed to her financial well-being” and therefore
dismissed the charges.150 It is not clear how this last threat quoted above could
be interpreted as a financial threat, particularly with the ominous “rest in peace”
closing the message.
ii.

THE OBJECTIVE COMPONENT: HER FEAR WASN’T REASONABLE

As outlined earlier, even where the accused repeatedly harassed the complainant,
causing her fear, and knew that he was harassing her, the accused will still be
acquitted if the judge decides her fear was not reasonable. In the present sample,
more acquittals resulted from the judge finding that the complainant did not fear
for her safety than from findings that her fear was not reasonable. The reasonableness requirement receives less scrutiny in the cases than was expected. However,
there is significant overlap between the assessment of whether the complainant

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Lincoln, supra note 119 at para 14.
Ibid.
Ibid at paras 24-25.
Ibid at para 25.
Ibid. See also Lukaniuk, supra note 119 at paras 6, 22. There, the court concluded that her
fear was financial because the accused had threatened to disrupt her job as a Homestay host.
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was afraid (which will be influenced by whether fear would be reasonable in the
circumstances) and whether that fear is assessed as reasonable.
For example, in R v PJJE, after the divorce of the accused and the complainant,
the accused entered the formerly shared home to recover some property to which
he felt he was entitled.151 At the time, the complainant had exclusive possession
of the house pursuant to a court order. As a result of his unauthorized entry, the
accused was placed under a section 810 peace bond that forbade any contact with
the complainant, except through a third party for the purpose of arranging access
to the children. He continued to contact the complainant, having numerous
letters delivered to her house or taped on her door. In other incidents, he followed
her or showed up at places she was attending so that he could see the children.
The trial judge characterized the accused’s repeated harassment as merely the
“zealous pursuit of what is perceived to be his parental rights,” and found that
his conduct could “fairly be classified as threatening only in the sense of someone
threatening to enforce a legal right.”152 The trial judge characterized the accused’s
conduct as merely the accused’s attempt to “check up on the complainant from
time to time,”153 despite the fact that he was under a court order not to contact
her. The accused had never threatened violence although there were allegations
of violence before the marriage broke down.154 The judge wrote, “His ‘threats’
[were] of prospective outcomes in court rather than physical harm.”155 Justice
Skilnick accepted that the complainant felt harassed and afraid, and that the
accused knew or ought to have known that his constant communication was
harassment or at least that he was wilfully blind about whether the complainant
was harassed.156 However, the judge was left in doubt as to whether her fear for
her safety or that of her children was reasonable, commenting:
In saying this, I do not minimize the feelings of frustration that the Complainant has
as a result of the bitterness and bad feelings from her matrimonial court battles with
the Accused. The difficulty I have in finding criminal liability in these circumstances
stems from the fact that all of the harassing behaviour is rooted in the matrimonial
issues. The “threats” are of legal consequences, not of expressed or implied threats
of violence or other affronts to the safety of the Complainant or of her children.157

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

PJJE, supra note 72 at para 10.
Ibid at paras 32-33.
Ibid at para 32.
Ibid at para 34.
Ibid.
Ibid at paras 36-37.
Ibid at para 38.
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Justice Skilnick noted that while some matrimonial disputes may escalate
into criminal harassment, “[t]he conduct of the Accused in this case leaves me in
doubt as to whether that stage has been reached,” given that he never threatened
the complainant, even in a veiled manner. Her fear was unreasonable because it
was based on past, not future violence:
His behaviour may have generated fear in the Complainant. However that fear seems
to be based on a concern that past behaviour might repeat itself. The communications
in and of themselves can not [sic] reasonably be construed as threatening of anything
other than legal action. I can not [sic] find beyond a reasonable doubt that his
conduct is such as to reasonably cause the complainant to fear for her safety.158

The trial judge was dismissive of the complainant’s fear, indicating that
while the accused was not “a living example of the prayer of St. Francis,” her fear
was unreasonable.159
In R v Benedict, the accused had courted the complainant in anticipation
of an arranged marriage according to their culture.160 She exercised her right
to refuse the marriage according to custom and told him she did not want to
see him anymore, but she agreed to meet him on one further occasion after
breaking off the relationship. He frequently phoned her and waited in his car
outside her workplace. The accused was cautioned more than once by the police
and was subject to a no contact order with respect to the complainant. He had
also apparently spent time in custody for prior harassing conduct against the
complainant, although it appears that no charges were ever proceeded with at the
time.161 The trial judge accepted all of the complainant’s evidence as credible and
rejected the evidence of the accused as incredible and unreliable.162 Nonetheless
he concluded, without any real explanation, that the complainant’s fear was
not reasonable:
158. Ibid at para 41. See also Benoit, supra note 78 at para 11. In Benoit, the complainant’s fear
was not reasonable because she did not cut off contact with the accused (via email) nor did
she instruct him to contact her only through counsel. This was another case in which access
to children was an issue.
159. PJJE, supra note 72 at para 44. The judge wrote: “[T]he conduct of the Accused may be
described as a zealous pursuit of what he perceived to be his parental rights” (ibid at para
32). Scholars have documented how men can manipulate their zealous pursuit of parental
rights to continue access and control over the women involved, particularly in the context of
violent relationships. See Beeble, Bybee & Sullivan, supra note 40.
160. Benedict, supra note 120 at para 4.
161. It is unclear from the judgment how long he spent in custody and what the basis of the
previous harassing conduct was.
162. Benedict, supra note 120 at para 18.
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I accept that [the complainant] was made nervous and upset by Mr. Benedict’s
appearance outside her home. Her privacy and sense of peace had been disturbed
once again by the accused’s pitiable conduct. However, given the chronology and
context of events since May 2001, while I consider it probable and while I accept
that the experience for her was quite unsettling, I am not satisfied on all the evidence
to the requisite standard that the complainant feared for her safety on an objective
standard of reasonableness. In this regard, the prosecution has failed to prove one of
the essential elements of criminal harassment.163

Yet the judge clearly had some concern for the safety of the complainant
given that he ordered the accused not to have any contact or communication
with the complainant or any member of her family.
In three of the four cases where acquittals were based entirely on the grounds
of unreasonableness (i.e., where subjective fear was not doubted), the accused
was subject to a no contact order to stay away from the complainant.164 This
finding is difficult to explain because one would expect that the presence of a
no contact order would give judges more support for the complainant’s fear and
the reasonableness thereof. The complainant presumably obtained a no contact
order for a reason, and the fact that an accused is willing to ignore a court order
demonstrates his willingness to step outside the bounds of the law to engage in
harassment. One would expect that the complainant’s resultant fear would be
considered reasonable. In the overall sample, the presence of a no contact order
made conviction more likely, as one would expect (see Appendix). It is possible
that police are more likely to lay charges of criminal harassment sooner where
there is a no contact order, and thus, the behaviour may not have escalated as far
(although the ongoing harassment in Benedict in particular was quite significant).
Yet, the high conviction rate in cases where no contact orders are in place belies
this possibility.165 These three cases represent such a small number that no real
163. Ibid at para 25.
164. PJJE, supra note 72 (accused was subject to a no contact order); Benoit, supra note 78;
Benedict, supra note 120.
165. See MDP, supra note 114. In that case, the accused and his wife had separated after a
relationship of several years and were involved in a custody dispute over their child. The
complainant had secured a no contact order against the accused that only permitted him
to contact the child via telephone. In the past, the accused had received a conditional
discharge for making harassing telephone calls, after he made 100-150 telephone calls to
his wife in two hours. The criminal harassment charges resulted from the accused’s alleged
suspicion (based on noises he heard over the phone) that his wife was abusing their child.
He repeatedly telephoned the police, resulting in police attendance at his wife’s home on
four occasions within 16 days. With respect to the criminal harassment charge, Warren J
found that the accused’s phone calls resulted from his genuine belief that his child was at
risk. Further, Warren J found that it was not objectively reasonable that the wife was ever
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conclusions can be drawn from the fact that fear was found to be unreasonable in
the face of a no contact order. However, the fact that women’s fear is considered
unreasonable when the harassment takes place in the context of a no contact
order creates a bind for women: if she does not get a no contact order, she was not
sufficiently afraid; yet, if she does, her fear may still be labelled as unreasonable.
Why should women seek no contact orders if their violation does not render the
fear they experience reasonable?
A finding that a woman’s fear is unreasonable, where the other elements of
the offence are established, is highly problematic in light of the evidence that
women are particularly attuned to the cues of abusive intimate male partners.
This has been widely recognized in the context of intimate partner violence,166
and there is no reason to suspect otherwise in the context of criminal harassment.
It is very likely that the complainant is in a better position than judges and
juries to assess whether to take seriously the harassing activities of her former
intimate partner.
As with the cases on subjective fear, the complainant who has taken steps
to avoid the harassment is more likely to have her fear labelled as reasonable.167
In R v Lauzon,168 for example, in deciding whether the complainant’s fear was
reasonable, the judge noted that she had changed her phone number to avoid
the accused, limited the places she went to in town to avoid him, and knew he
would be waiting for her when she left work. The court concluded, “It seems to
me clearly in that context it was reasonable for her to feel as she did that she was
fearful of Mr. Lauzon.”169
As mentioned, there is a significant overlap between a finding that a woman
was not afraid and that her fear was unreasonable. Both findings are premised
on assumptions driven by how we expect women to express and respond to fear.

166.
167.
168.
169.

in fear for her safety as a result of the telephone calls. The complainant had testified (ibid
at para 30): “I was worried just taking my garbage out. I felt uncomfortable getting in and
out of my car. I would always be, you know, double-checking my shoulders during grocery
shopping. It was not–it was like walking on eggshells all of the time.” Warren J found that
the phone messages that the accused left were not angry and threatening, but instead were
tearful, pleading, and rambling (ibid at para 32). Although Warren J accepted that “it may
be that she subjectively feared for her safety,” there was no objectively threatening language
(ibid at para 34).
R v Lavallee, [1990] 1 SCR 852 at 880-881, 55 CCC (3d) 97; Julie Blackman, “Potential
Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of Battered Women Who Kill”
(1986), 9:3&4 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 227. See also Sheehy, supra note 112 at 52.
See e.g. Malakpour, supra note 142 at paras 5-6, 18.
R v Lauzon, 2009 ONCJ 666, 86 WCB (2d) 791, aff’d 2010 ONSC 3592, 89 WCB (2d) 91.
Ibid at para 37.
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The former finding implies that a woman was not believed in her assertions of
fear, usually because she failed to take adequate steps to avoid the harassment or
because her fear was not manifest in the manner we expect women to demonstrate
fear. Finding that her fear was not reasonable implies that, while we may believe
she was afraid, that fear was exaggerated or illegitimate (or even hysterical). It
is important not to overstate the differences between an acquittal based on no
fear and an acquittal based on unreasonable fear. In the actual cases, the reasonableness requirement often plays a role in the subjective determination of fear.
In other words, courts may disbelieve her actual fear precisely because it is not
consistent with expectations of how a reasonable woman would behave in the
circumstances. For example, if the complainant fails to make clear that she wants
the harassment to stop, this failure may be “taken to be acting inconsistently with
her assertion of fear” or taken as “condoning his continued attentions,” which
can in turn be taken to “remove the objective basis for fear.”170 In other words,
both subjective fear and its reasonableness can be negated by evidence that the
complainant failed to behave like the “responsible victim.”
I am not suggesting that none of the acquittals in the above decisions were
justified. Nor am I suggesting that women should not take steps to avoid criminal
harassment by former intimate partners, as most choose to do. Rather, I would
argue that taking such steps should not be a necessary prerequisite to criminal
prosecution of harassers. Clearly, fear is not the only response to harassment, yet it
is the only response that section 264 acknowledges as legitimate. Judging women
for continuing to have contact with their harassers fails to acknowledge the
complex emotions that can result from being victimized by one’s former intimate
partner. Requiring the complainant to radically change her life or to take steps
to make sure the harassment is minimized shifts the focus onto her behaviour
and away from the behaviour of the accused in a way that is reminiscent of
the sexual assault context.171 Such responsibilization also shifts attention away
from the failure of the legal system to enforce no contact orders, and away from
the state’s obligation to protect women from harassing behaviour. The problem
lies both in the legislation, which requires reasonable fear, and in the judicial
interpretation thereof.

170. Mustaka, supra note 116 at para 47.
171. See e.g. Benedet, “Intoxicated Women,” supra note 49.
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2.

MENS REA: DID THE ACCUSED KNOW THAT HIS CONDUCT WAS
HARASSING?

The fault requirement for criminal harassment has been described as “one of the
most controversial elements of the crime” and has been dealt with differently in
different jurisdictions.172 The mens rea for criminal harassment in section 264
is whether the accused knew or was reckless with respect to the fact that the
complainant was harassed. This requirement has been criticized for allowing the
man who sees harassment as “romantic pursuit” of the complainant to avoid
conviction.173 Similarly, the man who calls or texts his former partner 200
times under the guise of resolving access to children will be acquitted if he does
not consider whether that behaviour is harassing.174 In some cases, the mens
rea requirement has been interpreted as a positive responsibility on women to
communicate to the potential accused that she is afraid or harassed.
The latter interpretation can be analogized to the early interpretation of
non-consent in the sexual assault context. Early case law put the responsibility
on women to communicate a “no” on the issue of consent. Only more recently
have the courts come to an understanding of affirmative consent that requires
a communication of consent (not of non-consent).175 In criminal harassment,
the wording of section 264 and its judicial interpretation creates an ongoing
requirement that a woman communicate to the accused that she is being harassed.
In other words, a man’s harassing pursuit of a woman, causing her to fear, is
acceptable unless she communicates otherwise to him. Sometimes contacting the
police or seeking a no contact order will be sufficient to demonstrate that one
is harassed,176 but as the data in the sample demonstrate, the existence of a no
contact order does not make conviction inevitable. The sample did not contain
many intimate partner cases where the male accused was acquitted because he
172. Troy E McEwan, Paul E Mullen & Rachel McKenzie, “Anti-Stalking Legislation and
Practice: Are We Meeting Community Needs?” (2007) 14:2 Psych, Psychol & L 207 at 209.
173. One study found that 58% of stalkers were motivated by their unwillingness to accept that
the relationship was over. See Doris Hall, Outside Looking In: Stalkers and their Victims (PhD
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1997) [unpublished], cited in Goldsworthy & Raj,
supra note 19 at 179.
174. Three leading psychologists studying “stalking” suggest that many perpetrators will not have
the high level of subjective fault that is demanded by some legislation such as Canada’s: “The
upshot of this lack of intent is that offenders who have caused great damage to their victims
over extended periods of time have been found not guilty and released.” McEwan, Mullen &
McKenzie, supra note 172 at 209.
175. Ewanchuk, supra note 50.
176. R v PMB, 2011 BCPC 370 at paras 42-45, [2011] BCJ No 2499 (QL).
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lacked the mens rea for criminal harassment. This is in part because mens rea is
usually the last element considered: the trial judge does not even consider mens
rea if there is a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s lack of fear or its reasonableness, both of which are part of the actus reus.
There is also an overlap between mens rea and reasonable fear such that
a finding of mens rea is less likely where the judge has concluded there is no
reasonable fear. The steps the complainant takes to avoid the accused, and what
she communicates to him, will be critical for both elements. The following
excerpt from R v Mustaka demonstrates the overlap between the elements of
criminal harassment:
These cases appear to often boil down to a question of degree. In Ryback, above,
Finch J.A. looked to whether the complainant had made her rejection of the accused
known to him, such that he must have been taken to be reckless as to the effect of
his attention on her. It seems the issue of communication may be relevant to both mens
rea and the reasonableness of the complainant’s assertion of fear. Arguably, some level of
persistent behaviour may occur in a dating context or in the course of a relationship
breakup and not be either objectively frightening or indicative of recklessness.
However, one would also expect that there is an onus on the accused to ensure
that a complainant welcomes his attentions, rather than adopting a course of wilful
blindness where there is no active encouragement. See: R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1
S.C.R. 330.
[A] complainant who fails to rebuff unwanted entreaties may in some circumstances
be taken to be acting inconsistently with her assertion of fear. That is essentially the
argument here, that the complainant had not made it plain enough to Mr. Mustaka
that the relationship was over, essentially that she was allowing or condoning his
continued attentions, which can either be taken to remove the objective basis for
fear on the part of the complainant or, presumably, to negate recklessness on the
part of the accused.177

As we have seen so often with sexual assault, the complainant must demonstrate
that the accused’s harassing behaviour was unwanted. The judge went on to hold
that, when dealing with former intimate partners, there is a higher onus on the
Crown to establish that the accused’s behaviour in pursuing a reconciliation
crossed the line into criminal conduct unless the accused’s conduct is “inherently

177. Mustaka, supra note 116 at paras 46-47 [emphasis added].
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offensive or obviously uninvited.”178 In other words, after being in an intimate
relationship, you are expected to tolerate a certain amount of harassment. This is
particularly problematic for women leaving abusive relationships.
In the six cases where the accused was acquitted on this basis,179 the rationale
was often that the complainant had failed in her efforts to inform the accused that
his behaviour was harassing; the accused was not expected to figure this out for
himself. In R v Benjamin,180 the accused was convicted at trial, but the conviction
was overturned on summary conviction appeal. The judgment is a bit unclear as
to which element of the offence led to the acquittal. However, the court made a
number of relevant statements regarding mens rea and regarding the complainant’s failure to communicate that she was harassed. For example, the court stated:
“In her telephone conversation, Ms. D did not say that he frightened her or that
he intimidated her or that she was threatened by him. She did not warn him that
there would be consequences should they encounter each other again.”181 The fact
that the complainant had initiated a phone call with the accused, even though
the purpose of the call was to make clear that she did not want to see him again,
was held against her even though the accused knew that the complainant wanted
nothing to do with him:
That Mr. Benjamin was obsessed and knew that Ms. D did not want to have anything
to do with him does not mean that he knew that she was afraid or intimidated by
his presence. It does not mean his conduct was designed to invoke the fear of an
invasion of Ms. D’s privacy. She never told him that he frightened her in their threehour telephone phone call, which was their last direct contact before May 27, 2008.
Her conduct in that telephone call, which she initiated, if anything, revealed her
strength and her resolve not to be overborne by his desire to reconcile.182
178. Ibid at para 48. This additional burden in the context of intimate partners is reminiscent
of all the challenges around prosecuting spousal sexual assaults. See e.g. the work
done on marital rape. Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault and Spousal Relationships,
‘Continuous Consent’ and the Law: Honest but Mistaken Judicial Beliefs” (2008) 32:1
U Man LJ [Randall, “Sexual Assault and Spousal Relationships”]; Jennifer Koshan, “The
Legal Treatment of Marital Rape and Women’s Equality: An Analysis of the Canadian
Experience” The Equality Effect (September 2010), online: <www.theequalityeffect.org/pdfs/
maritalrapecanadexperience.pdf> [Koshan, “The Legal Treatment of Marital Rape”].
179. Benjamin, supra note 78 at para 30; Wease, supra note 113 at para 22; Ross, supra note 78
at para 32; Frohlich, supra note 78 at paras 52-56; Seaton, supra note 72 at para 87; R v
Menkarios, 2010 ONSC 5478, 90 WCB (2d) 524 [Menkarios]. In Menkarios, the acquittal
was quashed on appeal and a new trial ordered but I have been unable to find any record of
whether the accused was retried.
180. Benjamin, supra note 78.
181. Ibid at para 30.
182. Ibid at para 45.
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In R v Wease, the accused was initially convicted of criminal harassment on
the basis of wilful blindness.183 The accused admitted he did not care what impact
his actions had on the complainant, and the trial judge found this was adequate
to constitute wilful blindness. On appeal, however, the judicial focus was on the
fact that the complainant had not sought a no contact order against the accused
nor communicated the fact that she was afraid:
I cannot agree that the accused engaged in such conduct that he knew harassed the
complainant nor was he reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the complainant
was harassed. In this case, the appellant received no warning that his conduct was
considered harassment by the complainant; nor was this communicated to the
appellant through the complainant’s lawyer or through the police. There was no
outstanding restraining order … There is no explanation given as to why, if the
complainant was fearful and concerned as to her own emotional or physical wellbeing, she did not pursue a restraining order in the Family Court proceedings.184

Similarly, in R v Ross, a summary conviction appeal was allowed on the basis
that the accused did not have the requisite mens rea.185 The accused suffered from
mental health issues following an accident. He had become aggressive and was
behaving unpredictably towards his wife. Although the complainant considered
herself to be separated from the accused, the appellate court found that she
might not have effectively communicated the separation to him. The court
made this finding even though they were living in separate homes and she had
started discussing divorce with him. She testified that she did not tell him that
his behaviour was harassing because she was afraid it would escalate his conduct.
The trial judge clearly found that the accused knew his behaviour was harassing,
given that the accused made repeated angry telephone calls to the complainant
and made regular disruptive visits to the complainant’s home and workplace. The
summary conviction appeal court disagreed, finding that she should have told
him that she was afraid and that he should stop communicating with her. The
court also noted that there was never any police intervention telling the accused
to stay away from the complainant, even though the complainant had in fact
called the police. The court indicated that she had never followed up with an
application for a no contact order nor was it clear that the police had actually
spoken with the accused and warned him not to contact the complainant.186

183.
184.
185.
186.

Wease, supra note 113 at para 8.
Ibid at paras 21-23.
Ross, supra note 78 at para 38.
Ibid at para 33.

593

(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

There may be a number of reasons why a woman would not want to
communicate her fear to her former intimate partner. For example, a communication of fear could make the complainant feel more vulnerable to the accused
and could encourage the accused to persist in his behaviour. In essence, a
communication of fear could demonstrate that the accused has been successful in
his attempts to harass the complainant, thus giving the accused even more power
over her. The complainant may feel she needs to retain some sense of control of
the situation and not to reveal to the accused just how fearful she is.187
The mens rea cases also demonstrate concerns similar to those of the
subjective fear cases—if the complainant initiates contact, for example, it is more
likely that the accused will be found not to have the mens rea. Paradoxically, the
complainant is expected to communicate the fact that she is harassed and yet
not to communicate with the accused. In R v Frohlich, the court found that the
complainant was “equivocal” because she had contacted the accused twice during
the relevant time period, even though one of those contacts was to insist that he
have no further contact with her.188 Similarly, in R v Seaton, the court held that
the complainant’s failure to inform the accused that she had a new boyfriend and
to tell him to stop calling her suggested that he did not know he was harassing
her by continuing to attempt to re-establish their relationship.189
In R v Menkarios,190 the accused was convicted at trial of assaulting his former
girlfriend twice; however, he was acquitted of criminal harassment because the
complainant apparently unconsciously invited the harassment. The summary
conviction appeal court summed up the trial judge’s reasons for acquitting the
accused of criminal harassment as follows:
The trial judge stated that he acquitted the accused on the harassment charge because
he was left wondering “whether in some unconscious sort of way [the complainant]
may not have inadvertently invited that or in an attitude of appeasement just to let
it pass and there may have been a note of encouragement.”191

It is not entirely clear from the trial decision to what element of criminal
harassment this “unconscious” invitation to be harassed relates, although the
appellate judgment seems to suggest it relates to both the complainant’s fear and
187. See Goldsworthy & Raj, supra note 19 at 187. The authors note that communicating distress
to the harasser can be counterproductive because such behaviours tell him his harassment is
having an effect.
188. Frohlich, supra note 78 at para 54.
189. Seaton, supra note 72 at para 87.
190. Menkarios, supra note 179.
191. Ibid at para 3.
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the accused’s intent. The appellate court noted that the trial judge’s observation
was purely speculative and that nothing in the evidence supported this conclusion.
The trial judge also indicated that the complainant had a tendency to look back
at the history of their relationship and “to attribute great importance to minor
hurts and peccadilloes,”192 a puzzling finding given that the relationship history
included two assaults prior to the charge of harassment in question. There was
strong evidence of ongoing harassment, and it was clear the accused had been
warned by the police to stop contacting the complainant. This type of judicial
pronouncement—that a woman unconsciously invited male violence against
her—would no longer be considered acceptable in the sexual assault context and
should not be acceptable in criminal harassment.
These mens rea cases demonstrate the problem with putting the responsibility on the complainant to alert the accused to the fact that his behaviour is
harassing. A subjective mens rea standard may be particularly inappropriate for
criminal harassment given that some accused men in these cases seem able to
detach themselves from the reality of their actions and to retain the belief that
they are engaged in legitimate pursuit of their former partner or of access to
children or property. Such an accused essentially gets a free pass with his harassing
behaviour until the complainant has communicated her distress to him. As such,
the mens rea component allows acquittal of the accused who believes he is entitled
to ongoing access to the complainant or the accused who never bothers to think
about how the complainant perceives his behaviour.
Canada is not unique in struggling to find an appropriate balance between
the need to recognize the harm to women from criminal harassment and the need
to avoid over-criminalization. Even though criminal harassment is a relatively
new crime in most jurisdictions, several countries have already amended their
new legislation in light of the types of frailties identified in this article. Part IV,
below, presents a brief summary of how other jurisdictions have responded to the
challenges in drafting criminal harassment legislation with a view to identifying
options for reform in the Canadian context.

IV. LESSONS FROM ABROAD
The 1990s saw a flurry of legislative action in the area of criminal harassment.
In many jurisdictions, as in Canada, the legislation was triggered by outrage over
cases where women had been murdered after being criminally harassed, usually
192. Ibid at para 66.
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by a former intimate partner.193 California passed the first anti-stalking law in the
United States in 1990, and every other state followed suit.194 Every Australian
jurisdiction enacted legislation between 1993 and 1996. In response to criticism
concerning gaps in the initial legislation, several jurisdictions in Australia significantly revised their legislation only a few years after enactment.195 New Zealand
passed criminal harassment laws in 1997.196 Very few of these jurisdictions
require both a high level of intention and a particular response on the part of the
complainant (as in Canada); most focus on one element or the other.197
193. Grant, Bone & Grant, supra note 8; McEwan, Mullen & MacKenzie, supra note 172 at 208.
194. California Penal Code, § 646.9 (2015); Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 19 at 256.
195. Western Australia amended its anti-stalking legislation in 1998 in the Criminal Law
Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (WA), ss 4-5. See Karen Whitney, “Western Australia’s New
Stalking Legislation: Will it Fill the Gap?” (1999) 28 UWA L Rev 293. Queensland
significantly amended its anti-stalking law in 1999 in the Criminal Code (Stalking)
Amendments Act 1999. See Sally Kift, “Stalking in Queensland: From the Nineties to Y2K”
(1999) 11:1 Bond LR 144. The Northern Territory amended its anti-stalking provisions in
2001. See Criminal Code Amendment Act (No 3) 2001 (NT). Victoria has also undertaken a
number of amendments. See e.g. Crimes (Stalking) Act 2003 (Vic).
196. Harassment Act 1997 (NZ), 1997/92, s 8.
197. Out of all the Australian jurisdictions, only South Australia has both a strict requirement
that the perpetrator cause “serious harm” or “serious apprehension or fear” and that the
victim actually fear harm as in Canada. McEwan, Mullen & McKenzie, supra note 172 at
210-11. Subjective intention to cause fear on the part of the perpetrator was an essential
mens rea element of almost all of the initial Australian anti-stalking provisions. However,
some Australian jurisdictions have since amended their legislation to incorporate a less
stringent intent requirement with Western Australia and the Northern Territory adopting an
objective standard of mens rea based on reasonableness. The amended Queensland provision
simply requires that the accused intend to direct his conduct at the complainant. There is
no requirement that he intend to cause her fear. The approach to the complainant’s response
is only an objective test, with no subjective test of what the complainant was actually
experiencing. The question is whether “reasonably in the circumstances,” a person would
apprehend or fear violence to herself, others, or to property, or whether she would experience
a “detriment.” Detriment is defined broadly and includes serious mental, psychological, or
emotional harm and also includes an impact on the person’s day-to-day behaviours such
as changing one’s route or form of transport to work or other places. See Criminal Code
(Stalking) Amendment Act 1999 (Qld), s 3. Each jurisdiction in Australia has a different
combination of elements with some focusing more on the intention of the perpetrator and
others focusing on whether the behaviour in question could be reasonably expected to cause
fear. Western Australia has fused these approaches by creating two stalking offences. “Stalking
with intent to intimidate” requires a subjective intention in the perpetrator to intimidate
the victim, but makes no mention of a required victim response. The second, less serious,
summary offence requires that the perpetrator’s actions could be reasonably expected to
intimidate and did in fact intimidate the victim, but no subjective intent on the part of the
perpetrator is necessary. See Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA), s 338E.

GRANT, INTIMATE PARTNER CRIMINAL HARASSMENT 596

England has recently moved away from a rigid focus on fear of violence.
In 1997, England enacted two provisions in the Protection from Harassment
Act 1997.198 These provisions were reportedly enacted hastily without a lot of
thought by a government wanting to appear to be responding to crime before
an election.199 Section 2 of the Act is the equivalent of a summary conviction
offence that involves harassment leading to alarm or distress. It is punishable by
a maximum 6 months imprisonment. Section 4 creates a more serious offence
where the conduct leads to a fear of violence on the part of the complainant.
This offence is subject to a maximum punishment of 5 years. More recently, in
2012, England enacted a new provision through amendments to the Protection
from Harassment Act 1997.200 The 2012 amendments were enacted in response to
a government report demonstrating that existing laws against harassment were
inadequate.201 Concerns were raised that many cases were too serious for the
lesser offence but could not meet the threshold of fear of violence required by
the more serious offence. The fear of violence provision set too high a threshold
and failed to recognize the impact of harassment even where there is no explicit
fear of violence.202 The new section 4A(1)(b)(ii) adds a third offence where the
accused engages in a course of conduct that causes the victim “serious alarm or
distress which has a substantial adverse effect on the victim’s usual day-to-day
activities” and where the defendant knew, or ought to have known that his
conduct would have this effect. This offence is punishable by a maximum 5
years’ imprisonment.203
This latest English provision has several advantages over Canada’s section 264.
First, it recognizes that harassment can have a profound negative impact on a
person’s day-to-day life without necessarily causing them fear. Never knowing
when the harasser is going to appear, incessant contact through social media,
changing one’s day-to-day life to avoid contact with the accused, and the
lack of control over one’s life that results from ongoing harassment could all
be recognized under this provision. The Home Office guidelines on the new
law suggest that indicators of substantial adverse effect on the usual day-to-day
activities could include:
198. Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK), c 40, ss 2, 4.
199. See Judith Gowland, “Protection from Harassment Act 1997: the ‘New’ Stalking Offences”
(2013) 77:5 J Crim L 387 at 387.
200. Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (UK), c 9, ss 111-12.
201. Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group, supra note 33.
202. Gowland, supra note 199 at 393. See also R v Ireland; R v Burstow (1997), [1998] AC 147
HL (Eng), [1998] 1 Cr App R 177 at 180-81 (where Steyn LJ raises this problem as well).
203. Protection from Harassment Act 1997, supra note 198, ss 4A(1)(b)(ii), 4A(5)(a).
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the victim changing her routes to work, work patterns, or employment;
the victim arranging for friends or family to pick up children from school (to avoid
contact with the stalker);
the victim putting in place additional security measures in their home;
the victim moving home;
physical or mental ill health;
the victim’s deterioration in performance at work due to stress;
the victim stopping /or changing the way they socialise.204

Thus, the English approach does not define one reaction that alone is
sufficient. The legislation acknowledges a broad range of possible reactions and
does not purport to present an exhaustive list of the types of harms recognized.
Under Canadian legislation, in contrast, a deteriorating work performance or a
change in socialization patterns would not pass the threshold of reasonable fear.
Second, the complainant’s reaction is not subjected to a standard of reasonableness. There does have to be a substantial adverse effect on her daily activities,
but this effect is assessed subjectively. The English structure prioritizes the
complainant’s actual response rather than the response that is expected of her.
While there is no requirement that the complainant’s response be reasonable in
the English legislation, there is a defence for an accused whose course of conduct
was reasonable for his own protection or the protection of property.205
Third, the accused does not have to intend to harass the complainant. It is
sufficient if a reasonable person would know that his behaviour is harassing. The
man who thinks he is merely pursuing his former partner to win her affections
or the man who believes he is entitled to harass his former spouse in his “zealous
pursuit” of access to his children would not have a defence as he does under the
Canadian legislation. Whereas Canadian law judges the reasonableness of the
complainant’s reaction, English law holds the harasser to a standard of reasonableness. While it remains to be seen how judges will interpret this provision,
and specifically whether they will assess the adequacy of women’s responses, the
English legislation is an example of a law reform effort that tries to address the
wide range of harms caused by criminal harassment in a manner that is responsive
to the impact of such behaviour on complainants.
204. Home Office Crime and Policing Group, A change to the Protection from Harassment Act
1997: introduction of two new specific offences of stalking, Circular 018/2012 (np: Home
Office, 16 October 2012).
205. Protection from Harassment Act 1997, supra note 198, s 4(3)(c).
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V. CONCLUSION
This study of the case law demonstrates that, too often, the Canadian law
on criminal harassment puts the responsibility on women to avoid criminal
harassment and to ensure that the accused knows that his behaviour is harassing,
rather than putting the responsibility on the accused to assess his own behaviour
and determine that repeated phone calls or texts, watching, following, sending
pictures to the complainant’s workplace, and the like, are harassing behaviours.
Criminal harassment may emerge from a previously violent relationship,
may escalate into physical violence, and in extreme cases, can lead to femicide.206
However, it is important to recognize that the potential for physical violence is
not the only harm of criminal harassment. The cumulative impact of a number of
behaviours that might not warrant criminal liability if considered in isolation can
have a devastating impact on a woman’s life. These behaviours leave complainants with a sense of dread, loss of control, and trauma that builds over time
and can have a significant impact on their mental and physical health. In the
context of intimate partner violence, researchers have demonstrated that it is not
necessarily the physical violence that causes the most harm to women but, rather,
the psychological impact of the male partner’s other controlling behaviours.207
Focusing on individual components of the harassment fails to acknowledge the
totality of the ordeal experienced by the victim of criminal harassment.208
Canadian legislation accordingly needs to be rethought with a view to
removing the obligation on women to establish that they have behaved like
proper victims. Our experience with sexual assault teaches that there is no ideal
victim, and no ‘correct’ response to criminal harassment. Requiring women to
respond in a particular way perpetuates stereotypes about female victimization

206. MacFarlane, supra note 10.
207. Evan Stark, “Commentary on Johnson’s ‘Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and
Asymmetry in Domestic Violence’” (2006) 12:11 Violence against Women 1019 at
1020. See also Sheehy, supra note 112 at 234. Sheehy demonstrates that the psychological
abuse and fear involved in intimate partner violence can be more devastating than the
physical violence.
208. Emily Finch, The Criminalisation of Stalking: Constructing the Problem and Evaluating
the Solution (London, UK: Cavendish Publishing, 2001) at 172. See also Stark, Coercive
Control, supra note 19 at 257 (describing “the cumulative effects when these acts occur as
part of a single pattern and are directed at a single victim [which] completely misses the
elements of subordination and entrapment, the most dramatic consequence when these acts
are combined.”).
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by intimate partners.209 In this respect, the recent English legislation provides a
useful example. Removing the focus on fear and the requirement that the fear
be reasonable would be a significant start. While it is impossible to remove the
impact on the complainant altogether from the definition of the offence (because,
in some cases, the behaviours of the accused are not otherwise criminal), it is
important that no one response be privileged over others. Women should not
be told that there is only one appropriate response to criminal harassment and
that all others will be disregarded. The English legislation is instructive in this
regard; it requires a substantial adverse effect on the usual day-to-day activities
of the complainant, thus acknowledging a range of responses to ongoing
harassment. Canadian law could incorporate a similar requirement for some
form of a substantial adverse effect on day-to-day activities. The complainant’s
response to the harassment should not be subjected to a reasonableness inquiry,
as women are in a better position to understand the cues of the harasser and the
seriousness of the harassment. People respond to trauma and abuse in different
ways, and the reasonableness requirement shifts the responsibility onto women
to be “responsible victims.”
With respect to mens rea, an objective standard of liability, such as that
adopted in the new English provision, would require the accused’s behaviour to
be subjected to a standard of reasonableness. The accused who reasonably believed
that his behaviour was not harassing would still be acquitted, but the accused who
unreasonably believed he was romantically pursuing the complainant or asserting
rights over property or children would no longer have a defence. In other words,
we should shift the risk that the accused’s harassing behaviour is unwanted onto
him, not the complainant. More importantly, if a standard of reasonableness
were used to assess the accused’s mental state, judges could no longer impose the
requirement that the complainant communicate her fear to the accused where a
reasonable person would have known his behaviour was harassing. It should be
sufficient if the harassing conduct takes place repeatedly, has a significant adverse
effect on the complainant, and the accused knows or ought to know that fact.
These changes would make a significant contribution to ensuring that
the criminal justice system recognizes the harm done to women by criminal
harassment. Other jurisdictions, most notably England, have taken steps to
amend their legislation to address the seriousness of criminal harassment. It is
time for Canada to follow suit.
209. See e.g. the work done on marital rape. See generally Randall, “Sexual Assault & Spousal
Relationships,” supra note 178; Koshan, “The Legal Treatment of Marital Rape,”
supra note 178.
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APPENDIX: CONVICTION RATES WITH AND WITHOUT A NO CONTACT ORDER
No Previous Order Present

Previous No Contact Order Present
Acquittals

# of
Cases

Convictions

Acquittals

# of
Cases

Male
53 (85.5%)
Accused

9 (14.5%)

62

81 (62.8%)

48 (37.2%)

129

Female
4 (100%)
Accused

0 (0%)

4

1 (25%)

3 (75%)

4

9

66

82

51

133

Convictions

Total

57

